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CHOOSING A COURT TO REVIEW  
THE EXECUTIVE 
JOSEPH W. MEAD∗ & NICHOLAS A. FROMHERZ** 
For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency 
action by single-judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by 
circuit courts.  This tinkering has not given way to a stable design.  Rather than settling 
on a uniform scheme—or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle—
Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and 
within statutes and agencies. 
In this Article, we offer a fresh look at the theoretical and empirical factors that ought 
to inform the allocation of the judicial power between district and circuit courts in suits 
challenging agency action.  We conclude that the current scheme is both incoherent and, to 
the extent it favors direct review by circuit courts, unjustified.  We conclude that initial 
review by district courts is, in general, the better option, and a clear divide is preferable to 
the ad hoc approach that Congress has favored.  Along the way, we offer a new analytical 
framework for deciding which court should review the Executive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review of executive action occupies a unique place in federal 
jurisprudence.  But which court undertakes that review?  The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prescribes a near-universal standard of 
review of agency decisions, but it says nothing about the proper forum.  
Instead, litigants must look elsewhere for jurisdiction, and the United States 
Code is replete with thousands of compromises dividing initial review of 
agency decisions between district and circuit courts.1 
This complex scheme of dividing original jurisdiction between appellate 
and trial courts has no parallel in any other aspect of modern federal 
jurisdiction.  And while this scheme of split review is familiar to 
practitioners of administrative law, time has hardly served to iron out the 
wrinkles.  Determining the proper court to review administrative decisions 
has been the subject of debate since Marbury v. Madison2 and requires 
 
 1. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 309 (1985) (“A 
recurrent issue of federal jurisdiction is whether judicial review of an administrative agency’s 
decision may be sought in a federal district court in the first instance or must be sought 
directly in a federal court of appeals.”). 
 2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 148 (1803). 
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frequent Supreme Court intervention to unravel.3 
Today’s allocation of jurisdiction to review agency decisions is 
untenable.4  Complexity has its costs—for litigants, for agencies, and for the 
courts themselves.  To determine which court has jurisdiction, one is left to 
sift through more than one thousand statutory provisions sprawled across 
fifty-one titles of the United States Code, enacted piecemeal through more 
than one hundred years of legislation.5  On top of these statutory provisions 
are decades of judicial interpretations, often pointing in inconsistent 
directions and further clouding the question of jurisdiction.  The ambiguity 
of this divided system leads not only to deadweight loss in terms of litigating 
jurisdiction, but it can lead to forfeited claims if a litigant misses a deadline 
by filing in the wrong court. 
The costs of complexity might be warranted if there were strong reasons 
for favoring one type of review over another in a given situation.  Yet one 
searches in vain for evidence of intelligent design in the current system.  
Few patterns emerge from the seemingly random distribution of initial 
agency review between circuit and district courts, and Congress generally, 
though not always,6 declines to explain its choice of forum.7  Even a casual 
survey can find countless examples of similar actions by different agencies 
being challenged in different courts.  For example, decertified airline 
mechanics proceed directly to circuit court,8 while decertified Navy 
 
 3. See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2130 (2012); Sackett v. EPA, 
132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2012); Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 600 (2012); Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147–48 (2010). 
 4. Over seventy years ago, scholars issued a similar indictment of a far simpler (but 
still divided) system of judicial review of agency decisions, yet things have only gotten worse.  
James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law: The Walter-Logan Bill, 53 HARV. L. REV. 
1077, 1090 (1940) (“It is clear that no one can defend today our variegated scheme for 
judicial review of administrative action . . . .”); Orrin B. Evans, Historical Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts to Review Federal Administrative Action, 31 IOWA L. REV. 369, 371 (1946) (“There 
was, of course, no sense in the dual system of nisi prius courts . . . .”); cf. ROSCOE POUND, 
ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 107, 195 (1940) (describing as “anomalous” the nineteenth 
century system of two courts of general trial jurisdiction). 
 5. Evans, supra note 4, at 376 (“A lawyer seeking light on the question of judicial 
review of administrative orders cannot turn to any statute or chapter containing a 
comprehensive code on the subject . . . .  He must search the statutes relating to the 
substantive law of his case.”). 
 6. For example, Congress’s concern with dilatory appeals motivated its repeated 
concentration of review of deportation orders in the courts of appeals.  Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 
217, 224 (1963). 
 7. Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 980, 999 (1975) (noting the “frequent absence of any apparent legislative 
purpose for particular jurisdictional limitations”); Evans, supra note 4, at 382 (“I have not 
been able to find any measurable degree of consistency within any classification.”). 
 8. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2012). 
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instructors or body armor manufacturers go to district court.9  Horse 
Protection Act regulations can be challenged in district court, but 
adjudications go to the circuit court.10  The rule is flipped for the 
Department of Energy, where regulations under the Energy Policy Act can 
be challenged in the circuit court,11 while determinations of entitlement to 
Energy Star designation are brought in district court.12  And Congress 
continues to enthusiastically churn out jurisdictional decisions for agency 
review each year without any apparent framework, making the problem 
worse and worse. 
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that scholars and practitioners 
have wrestled with the jurisdictional difficulties that exist for particular 
statutory provisions or agency programs.13  Determining the proper court 
for initial review in any given context is obviously important, but the 
limited nature of such an inquiry makes it difficult to address the real 
problem: the absence of organizing principles and uniform criteria. 
Our analysis proceeds in three Parts.  In Part I, we provide a brief 
background on the historical and modern system of judicial review of 
agency decisions.  We also map out the jurisdictional tests that courts have 
adopted to deal with the statutory mess and argue that these tests have 
confused rather than clarified matters. 
In Part II, we address the central question—which court, or courts, 
should review agency decisions?  We analyze the issue as it is usually 
presented—a choice between initial review in the district court or direct 
review in the circuit court.  To conduct our analysis, we consider a number 
of different factors, including efficiency, especially cost and time to final 
decision, accuracy of judgment, legitimacy and appearance, litigant 
 
 9. See, e.g., Foster v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146 (D.D.C. 2012); Pinnacle Armor, 
Inc. v. United States, 2012 WL 2994111, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), (e)(2). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b)(1). 
 12. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 679 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 13. See generally Allison LaPlante & Lia Comerford, On Judicial Review Under the Clean 
Water Act in the Wake of Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center: What We Now 
Know and What We Have Yet to Find Out, 43 ENVTL. L. 767 (2013); Shaina N. Elias, Essay, 
Challenges to Inclusion on the “No-Fly List” Should Fly in District Court: Considering the Jurisdictional 
Implications of Administrative Agency Structure, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1015 (2009); Paul R. 
Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability 
Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731 (2003); Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: 
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum 
Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 
1297 (1986); Jonathan A. Schorr, Note, The Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action: 
Interpreting Special Review Statutes, 63 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1983); David P. Currie & Frank I. 
Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, supra note 7; Stephen B. Goldberg, District Court Review of 
NLRB Representation Proceedings, 42 IND. L.J. 455 (1967). 
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preferences, workload distribution, the benefit of precedent, and the cost of 
jurisdictional uncertainty.  Through this analysis, we find that the case for 
direct review in circuit courts has little in the way of theoretical or empirical 
heft.  In the context of challenges to agency action, it would appear that 
district courts are generally as capable—and usually more efficient—than 
their counterparts at the circuit level. 
In Part III, we build on our analysis to make the case for uniform rules.  
The current scheme drives up the costs for litigants and the courts alike.  
These costs are not justified by gains in accuracy or otherwise superior 
decisionmaking.  The upshot is two-fold: (1) going forward, Congress 
should revisit the allocation of judicial power in cases challenging agency 
action, not in a piecemeal fashion, as has been its tendency, but in a 
comprehensive manner that applies uniform criteria; and (2) in conducting 
this review, Congress should give serious weight to a scheme that favors 
initial review by district courts.  Yet, regardless of how the balance is 
struck—in favor of initial review by district courts or by circuit courts—we 
desperately need an allocative scheme that is clear and informed by 
uniform criteria. 
In sum, this Article offers a fresh take on the beguiling jurisdictional 
landscape of judicial review of agency decisions.  By deconstructing the 
status quo and analyzing the issue anew, we identify several factors to guide 
the inquiry of which court should review the Executive.  Along the way, we 
offer specific guidance to courts and litigants to help make sense of the 
complicated status quo, and we pave the way for empirical study to address 
the uncertainties surrounding judicial review by district courts and circuit 
courts. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISIONMAKING 
In this Part, we provide a brief background on the historical and modern 
systems of judicial review.  Today, judicial review of federal agency 
decisions is largely governed by the APA.14  Under the APA, courts review 
agency decisions under a deferential set of standards that mimic, in many 
regards, an appellate court’s review of the discretionary decisions of a trial 
court.15  This review is conducted based on the administrative record,16 a 
record that is, at least in theory, frozen in time and unalterable before the 
court.17  Although both the standard and scope of review are nearly 
 
 14. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 16. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 17. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (stating the standard should come from the 
administrative record already in existence). 
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universal,18 the court that undertakes this review varies sharply depending 
on the nature of the agency action and the legal theories of the challenge.19  
Thus, in a departure from the usual model of federal litigation, challenges 
to hundreds of agency decisions can only be brought directly in the circuit 
court, bypassing the district court altogether.  Whether a case begins in the 
district or circuit court is up to Congress, and Congress’s choice of forum 
varies seemingly at random from statute to statute, reflecting uncertainty 
about the ideal forum for challenges to administrative action.20 
A. Background on Judicial Review 
Historically, the opportunities to obtain judicial review of Executive 
Branch action were extremely limited.21  Individuals claiming injury could 
bring writs of mandamus,22 habeas corpus,23 and other prerogative writs 
whose familiarity has been lost to time.24  These writs were extremely 
limited in scope—mandamus being limited to “ministerial” duties,25 and 
habeas corpus requiring the petitioner to be in custody—and provided 
severely limited opportunities for judicial oversight of the Executive.  
Alternatively, a citizen might pursue a tort claim—say, defamation or 
trespass—against an aggrieving officer, but the suit would be limited by the 
vagaries of state law and falter against the bar of sovereign immunity if the 
officer acted within the scope of his official duties.26  Today, an individual 
might also pursue a constitutional tort claim against an officer but must still 
 
 18. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.  As Aaron-Andrew Bruhl points out, however, it is possible that 
doctrinal homogeneity masks variation in practice.  While invoking the same standard of 
deference (e.g., Chevron), it may well be the case that the Supreme Court, and even the circuit 
courts, actually afford far less deference to agency calls than district courts.  See generally 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 727 (2013). 
 19. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 20. Though there may be some limits on Congress’s power to define the jurisdiction of 
the lower federal courts, split allocation is clearly constitutional.  See Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 
F.2d 695, 704–07 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 21. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1319–20 (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., Richard E. Flint, The Evolving Standard for Granting Mandamus Relief in the Texas 
Supreme Court: One More “Mile Marker Down the Road of No Return”, 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 10–47 
(2007) (discussing the development of the writ of mandamus). 
 23. Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 762–63 
(2013). 
 24. See generally Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523 
(1923) (providing a historical background on various types of writs found in the English legal 
system). 
 25. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 580 (1838). 
 26. Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of 
the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 533 (2013). 
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overcome various immunities.27 
As the twentieth century arrived and the administrative state grew, so 
too did elaborate statutory schemes providing for judicial oversight of 
agency decisionmaking.28  In order to prescribe a uniform set of standards, 
Congress passed the APA in 1946, which dictates the standard of review 
that applies to the vast majority of challenges to agency action.29  
Significantly, as discussed below, the APA does not specify which court will 
hear the challenge. 
Under the APA’s approach, challenges to administrative decisions are 
treated largely like appeals from the agency’s decision.30  Like an appeal, 
the reviewing court considers the agency’s decision on the factual record 
developed by the agency.31  Agency factual findings control the reviewing 
court, be it district or circuit, so long as they are supported by “substantial 
evidence.”32  Agency judgment calls are not reviewed for their correctness 
or wisdom, but only for whether they are arbitrary or capricious.33  
Although the APA does not explicitly prescribe a deferential standard for 
reviewing an agency’s legal interpretations,34 the Chevron,35 Skidmore,36 and 
Seminole Rock37 doctrines require significant judicial deference to an agency’s 
view of law.  If the court concludes that the agency’s judgment was in error, 
the proper remedy is a remand to reassess, not for the court to decide the 
 
 27. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 208 
(2013). 
 28. Note, Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 901 
(1957). 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 30. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 
828 (2012).  Before 1900, judicial review was generally through de novo common law 
actions and did not follow the appellate model.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, 
Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 939 (2011). 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 706; Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (noting that “the focal 
point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some 
new record made initially in the reviewing court”). 
 32. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 
 33. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 34. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–42 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to cite.  But it was in accord with the 
origins of federal-court judicial review.”). 
 35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(requiring deference to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutes). 
 36. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (requiring a different degree of 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes). 
 37. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (requiring deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations). 
8 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [67:1 
issue de novo.38  The APA’s standards apply to all judicial review of agency 
decisions unless another statute expressly prescribes a different standard.39 
Although the appellate model applies in many respects to challenges of 
agency action, they are, both formally and functionally, not appeals.  As a 
formal matter, they are new actions, a tenet which reflects the boundary 
between the Executive and Judicial Branches.  Further, the fact that one 
branch is reviewing the work of another immediately implicates numerous 
separation of powers concerns.  Thus, unlike an appellate court, whose 
review of lower court action is simply a question of allocation of the judicial 
power, the proper review of agency action reflects due concern for the 
allocation of power between the branches.  As the Supreme Court said in 
1894, when decreeing a particularly deferential standard of review for 
agency action: “But this is something more than a mere appeal.  It is an 
application to the court to set aside the action of one of the executive 
departments of the government.”40 
Judicial review of agency action is not without its controversy, at least in 
non-constitutional cases.41  A generalist judge reversing the decision of an 
expert agency strikes some as rather like the pupil correcting the teacher.42  
Still, proponents of judicial review might argue that court ratification is 
needed to fulfill the sentiment behind Marbury’s famous dictum: “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”43  Indeed, courts are often thought to be superior to agencies in 
 
 38. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 657–
58 (2007) (noting that the circuit court erred because “it jumped ahead to resolve the merits 
of the dispute” rather than remanding to the agency). 
 39. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988). 
 40. Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124 (1894). 
 41. Robert Shaffer, Judicial Oversight in the Comparative Context: Biodiversity Protection in the 
United States, Australia, and Canada, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,169, 10,170 
(2013) (“In practice, though, arbitrariness review has proven hugely controversial, 
generating an array of scholarship examining its impact on the broader policymaking 
process.”); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 1243, 1251–52 (1999). 
 42. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review 
as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011) (discussing “[t]he premise 
that expert agencies are better situated than generalist judges to make policy decisions in 
light of scientific uncertainty”); Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass’n v. FDA, 766 F.2d 592, 599–600 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Though CLMA [Contact Lens Manufacturers Association] presses this 
argument with vigor, we are mindful that in such matters generalist courts see through a 
glass darkly and should be especially reluctant to upset an expert agency’s judgment that a 
party has failed to adduce sufficient scientific proof of safety and effectiveness.”). 
 43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Cross, supra note 41, at 
1247–48, 1266–68 (criticizing this rationale, noting that it “is almost tautological”).  The 
strength of this rationale loses much of its force in light of doctrines such as Chevron.  Id. at 
1278. 
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ensuring that the rights of individuals are left untrammeled.44  Further, 
federal judges are less susceptible than administrators to “capture” by a 
particular segment of the population.45  Finally, the threat of further review 
may encourage agencies to be more thorough and careful in their 
decisionmaking.46 
But judicial review also introduces significant downsides.  Judicial review 
tends to transfer final decisionmaking power from the Executive Branch 
officials, who have some measure of political accountability, to judges “who 
have no constituency.”47  Moreover, the specialized subject-matter experts 
at the federal agency are better equipped than generalist judges to make 
decisions regarding the technical details of agency policy.48 
Beyond comparative competence between the branches, there is also a 
significant cost to subjecting decisions to additional layers of review.  
Judicial review adds a level of unpredictability and uncertainty about the 
validity of agency action, which undermines reliance by all interested 
parties.49  Moreover, the availability of judicial review may distort 
decisionmaking by federal agencies, who may be tempted to be overly 
cautious ex ante based on fears of drawing the “worst case scenario” judge.50  
This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court’s standing 
jurisprudence, which expressly favors plaintiffs who are the target of a 
regulation over those who experience a more attenuated effect, giving those 
who would challenge agency action a ticket into court, while denying access 
to those favoring additional regulation.51  And, of course, there is the 
 
 44. Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological 
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1034–35 (1968) (“Neither the executive nor the legislature 
is as dependable as the judiciary in making such determinations” of private rights). 
 45. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–23 (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the 
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
 46. However, even if there is a lack of judicial review, agencies remain susceptible to 
presidential or congressional reversal. 
 47. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984). 
 48. Michael C. Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character: Homeowners Associations 
and the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 856 (2013). 
 49. See Cross, supra note 41, at 1249 (“[A] circuit split over the regulations of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (‘EPA’) on granting Clean Air Act variances kept those 
rules ‘in limbo for well over two years and led to different treatment of polluters in different 
parts of the country.’”). 
 50. Id. at 1251–52 (internal quotation marks omitted); Kendrick v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 
455, 457 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Because these reviewers are selected at random from a large pool, 
to be really safe the ALJ [Administrative Law Judge] must please the most demanding federal 
judge in the jurisdiction.”). 
 51. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992); Nicholas A. Fromherz 
& Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty and Standing After Massachusetts 
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substantial financial cost to requiring courts to decide, and for agencies to 
litigate these lawsuits52—cases which compose approximately 23% of the 
federal court docket.53 
Nevertheless, at least since the adoption of the APA, congressional policy 
has tended to allow agency decisions to be reviewed by courts, although in 
recent years there is some movement toward more limited review.54  
Congressional policy is far more varied, however, when it comes to picking 
the court that will undertake the review. 
B. Choice of Forum 
Although the routine federal case begins and ends in district court,55 
cases involving federal agencies are often different.  While the default rule is 
that administrative challenges begin in district court, Congress has provided 
innumerable exceptions that allow a case to be commenced directly in the 
court of appeals, bypassing the district court altogether.  These provisions 
have been enacted piecemeal over more than a century of ad hoc 
legislating. 
When a circuit court has jurisdiction under a specific statutory provision, 
that jurisdiction is exclusive and preempts district court jurisdiction over 
that claim.56  However, in most situations, a challenge that falls outside of a 
direct review provision can be brought in the federal district courts.  
Notably, however, the choice of forum does not affect the standard to be 
applied, as both circuit courts and district courts apply the same APA 
standard to the same administrative record.57 
 
v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 135 (2010) (“The Court has also articulated a separate 
presumption against standing for individuals who are not the object of the regulation (or lack 
thereof) they seek to challenge.”). 
 52. President Roosevelt vetoed a precursor to the APA, explaining “I am convinced 
that it would produce the utmost chaos and paralysis in the administration of the 
Government at this critical time.  I am convinced that it is an invitation to endless and 
innumerable controversies at a moment when we can least afford to spend either 
governmental or private effort in the luxury of litigation.” 86 Cong. Rec. 13,943 (1940); 
James C. Thomas, Fifty Years with the Administrative Procedure Act and Judicial Review Remains an 
Enigma, 32 TULSA L.J. 259, 281 (1996). 
 53. United States Courts, Caseload Statistics 2012, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscou 
rts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tabl
es/B01Mar12.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 54. For example, in recent decades, Congress has expressly barred judicial review of 
numerous decisions under Medicare and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  42 
U.S.C § 1395l(t)(12) (2012); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–586 (1996). 
 55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 56. Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 57. Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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1. History 
The unusual divide—sometimes one court, sometimes another—is 
unique to judicial review of administrative law.  In part, this reflects a deep 
and long-running controversy.  Indeed, a debate over choice of forum for 
administrative review set the stage for one of the Supreme Court’s most 
famous decisions, Marbury v. Madison.58  After scores of timeless dicta, Chief 
Justice Marshall held that the Supreme Court could not issue a writ of 
mandamus in an original proceeding to compel the Secretary of State to 
deliver a commission to a newly appointed Justice of the Peace.59  Instead, 
the Court found, such a challenge could only be brought in a lower court.60 
Of course, Marbury says nothing about which lower court Congress may 
charge with review of agency action.61  And Congress has exercised its 
discretion by providing a myriad scheme of review ever since it first 
provided for statutory review of administrative action. 
The idea of direct appellate court review of agency decisionmaking 
traces its origins back almost to the beginning of the modern administrative 
state.  When Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
in the late 1800s, it made no allowance for an outside party to challenge 
ICC’s action.62  Instead, the Interstate Commerce Act placed the onus on 
ICC to come to court to seek enforcement of its conclusions through a 
“summary” proceeding, “without the formal pleadings and proceedings 
applicable to ordinary suits in equity,” at which ICC’s findings were 
intended to be prima facie proof of the facts.63  By 1906, however, judicial 
scrutiny of and hostility toward ICC decisionmaking led Congress to adopt 
the Hepburn Act, which made ICC orders self-executing and shifted the 
burden to an outside party to obtain judicial review.64  In 1910, Congress 
created a special Article III circuit court, the United States Commerce 
Court, to review decisions of ICC,65 but the court lasted only three years 
 
 58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 59. Id. at 175–76. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Although Congress can delegate large amounts of discretion to federal agencies, it is 
an open question whether Congress can delegate its legislative authority to create Article III 
courts and control their jurisdiction.  Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 
1154 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting the “constitutional questions” that might arise if a statute were 
interpreted to delegate to the President the authority to bestow Article III jurisdiction on a 
court). 
 62. Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 49–104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Robert L. 
Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1986). 
 63. Interstate Commerce Act § 16, 24 Stat. at 384–85; see also Merrill, supra note 30, at 
950. 
 64. Merrill, supra note 30, at 956–58. 
 65. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61–218, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). 
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before it was widely considered a failure and thus abolished.66  In place of 
the Commerce Court, Congress provided that decisions of ICC would be 
reviewed de novo in the district court by a three-judge panel, with appellate 
review being available directly to the Supreme Court.67 
In 1914, Congress first provided for direct appellate court review when it 
created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).68  The legislative history 
provides little insight into Congress’s motivation for inventing direct circuit 
review.69  The sole rationale given for this approach was that direct circuit 
court review would provide for “the speediest settlement of disputed 
questions.”70  Yet this model would be copied in some, but not all, agencies 
created in the years to come. 
For the next several decades, Congress variously provided for direct 
circuit court review, for three-judge district court review, or for single-judge 
district court review.  During this era, Congress adopted some of the most 
prominent examples of direct circuit court review, including for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 193371 and the National 
Labor Relations Board in 1935.72  Yet despite the significance of these 
agencies, Congress said very little about its reasons behind its preference for 
the court of appeals.  The little that was said indicates simply that Congress 
was copying what it had done with FTC.73  At other times, however, 
Congress provided for district court review,74 and it was not always clear 
why Congress preferred one forum over another.75 
 
 66. Merrill, supra note 30, at 966–67. 
 67. Pub. L. No. 63–32, 38 Stat. 208, 219–20 (1913).  This arrangement exists today 
only in very limited circumstances related to the Voting Rights Act.  28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) 
(2012).  See generally Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 
30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (1996). 
 68. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63–203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)).  Perhaps not uncoincidentally, the Act also expressly 
provided for appellate-style review of the agency’s decision: the decision would be reviewed 
only on questions of law, and then only on the record developed by the agency.  Id. 
 69. Evans, supra note 4, at 372 (“There is nothing in the debate in Congress . . . to 
indicate that Congress was aware of the significance of the step it was taking, viewed either 
as a landmark in the development of the techniques of judicial review of administrative 
agencies or as a curious phenomenon in the framework of the federal judicial system.”). 
 70. H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.). 
 71. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–22, § 9(a), 48 Stat. 74, 80–81 (1933). 
 72. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74–198, § 10(e), 49 Stat. 449, 
454–55 (1935). 
 73. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 74TH CONG., COMPARISON OF S. 2926 
(73D CONG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONG.) 7 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NAIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 at 1319, 1329 
(1949). 
 74. See Note, supra note 28, at 905–06 nn.529–30 (collecting statutes). 
 75. See Evans, supra note 4, at 382 (noting that the author could not discern any 
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By the middle of the twentieth century, review provisions were scattered 
over a dozen different statutes in several different fora.76  The adoption of 
the APA four years earlier had standardized many practices relating to 
administrative review (including, notably, the standard and scope of 
review), but the APA said nothing about the court in which those decisions 
would be reviewed.  Scholars began to criticize Congress’s ad hoc 
decisionmaking.  For example, in 1940, Harvard Law Professor James 
Landis—who had previously spent time heading several agencies with 
direct review provisions—announced that “[i]t is clear that no one can 
defend today our variegated scheme for judicial review of administrative 
action.”77  As set forth below, we wholly agree with Professor Landis and 
argue that the problem has grown exponentially worse since he wrote. 
The closest that Congress ever came to devising a uniform system was 
with the Administrative Orders Review Act in 1950, which placed initial 
review of specified agency orders with the circuit courts.78  The 
Administrative Orders Review Act, also known as the Hobbs Act,79 was the 
product of a years-long commission to study the administrative review 
procedures then in place.  The primary driver for the legislation, however, 
appears to have been concern for the Supreme Court’s workload, and not 
an effort to harmonize and improve the process for initial review.  This is 
underscored by the fact that the Administrative Orders Review Act applied 
only to a small number of agency decisions, all of which had previously 
been reviewed under the ICC model of a three-judge district court with 
direct review to the Supreme Court.80  A common criticism was that voiced 
by Chief Justice Stone: the appeals of right to the Supreme Court in agency 
review cases had burdened the Court with numerous appeals of minor 
importance and merit.81 
Given the overriding concern with the Supreme Court review aspect of 
pre-existing procedure, relatively little was said in the legislative history 
about why circuit courts were chosen to serve as the initial forum for 
 
consistency in Congress’s classifications). 
 76. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 3 (1950) (“The method of review of most of the 
judicially reviewable orders of the agencies involved . . . [wa]s prescribed by many provisions 
scattered throughout different statutes”); Evans, supra note 4, at 376 (discussing the lack of 
any comprehensive code of judicial review of administrative orders). 
 77. Landis, supra note 4, at 1090; see also Evans, supra note 4, at 371 (“There was, of 
course, no sense in the dual system of nisi prius courts . . . .”). 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(a)–(b) (2012). 
 79. Pub. L. No. 81–901, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950).  Not to be confused with the other, 
perhaps more famous Hobbs Act, dealing with racketeering and corruption.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951 (2012). 
 80. See Breck P. McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28 
CALIF. L. REV. 129, 131–32 (1940). 
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 2 (1950). 
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agency challenges.82  The bulk of the specific history argued that 
assembling a three-judge district court was clumsy and that district courts 
were too busy to be bothered with reviewing the actions.83  However, the 
House Committee boldly proclaimed that the procedure of initial circuit 
court review with discretionary Supreme Court review was “the more 
modern method and [wa]s generally considered to be the best method for 
the review of orders of administrative agencies,”84 because it eliminates 
duplicative proceedings in the district court and the court of appeals.85  
Chief Judge Orie Phillips of the Tenth Circuit, principal drafter of the 
Administrative Orders Review Act, identified a different concern: that 
entrusting review to three-judge district courts without any right to appeal 
would be unseemly.86 
Yet despite the House Committee’s confidence in its work, the 
Administrative Orders Review Act was not universal, applying instead only 
to a limited list of agencies.87  Excluded agencies could be reviewed under 
the terms of their organic statute or, absent a jurisdictional provision, in the 
federal district courts under the APA and general federal question 
jurisdiction. 
2. Today 
Over the last sixty years, the number of regulatory decisions subject to 
challenge has sharply increased, leading to a commensurate increase in 
 
 82. See generally id. 
 83. Providing for the Review of Orders of Certain Agencies, and Incorporating into the Judicial Code 
Certain Statutes Relating to Three-Judge District Courts: Hearings on H.R. 1468, H.R. 1470, and H.R. 
2771 (80th Cong.) and H.R. 2915 & H.R. 2916 (81st Cong.) Before Subcomms. No. 3 and No. 4 of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (80th Cong.) and Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st 
Cong. 65 (1949) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Harold I. Baynton, Special Assistant to 
the Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“We feel that the three-judge court as presently 
constituted is somewhat disrupting in the district courts.  As you know, most of the district 
courts are busy courts.  They have ample business before them.”). 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 4 (1950). 
 85. Id. (“The submission of the cases upon the records made before the administrative 
agencies will avoid the making of two records, one before the agency and one before the 
court, and thus going over the same ground twice.”). 
 86. See Hearings, supra note 83, at 112.  As Judge Phillips put it: 
We felt that there should be one review of the right in an appellate court.  That is one 
reason why we provided for a review in the court of appeals rather than in a three-
judge district court.  Not that the three judges of the district court would not do as 
good a job as the court of appeals—they might do a better job, in fact—but we 
thought it was sort of traditional that there should be one review of right; and, if we 
were going to take away appeals of right, there ought to be hearings by the court of 
appeals. 
Id. 
 87. McAllister, supra note 80, at 131–32. 
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congressional choices of forum.  And Congress’s choices have varied 
dramatically—without apparent rhyme or reason—from statute to statute, 
year to year, and even within particular legislation.  As a leading treatise 
puts it, “[A] startling array of specific statutory provisions establish court of 
appeals jurisdiction to review actions of agencies that range from the major 
independent regulatory agencies to a large number of executive officials.”88  
The treatise authors share our estimation that “[c]omplete enumeration of 
the statutes probably would be impossible at any given moment, even with 
the aid of sophisticated computer searches.”89 
Indeed, by our rough count, there are more than a thousand statutory 
provisions sprinkled through fifty-one titles of the United States Code that 
direct agency cases to a particular court.90  Most of these provisions direct 
litigants to a regional circuit court, to the D.C. Circuit, or, in limited 
instances, to the Federal Circuit.91  Thus, for example, Congress has 
channeled to the circuit court most challenges to Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) decisions under the Clean Air Act and Board of Immigration 
Appeals decisions under the Immigration and Nationality Act, yet 
preserved some decisions in the district court under each statute.92  There 
are still further oddities within these provisions.  For instance, one statute, 
the Federal Election Commission Act, provides that constitutional 
challenges to the election laws proceed directly to the en banc D.C. Circuit, 
rather than the typical three-judge panel.93  In addition to these provisions, 
an untold number of agency decisions are left to the default route of initial 
district court review. 
The most recent major expansion of the administrative state came with 
the 2010 creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).  
Except for a few narrow categories of actions which may be challenged 
directly in the court of appeals,94 including challenges brought by other 
 
 88. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3941 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 377 (noting the “large number of new statutes which explicitly 
provided for direct court-of-appeals review of rulemaking”). 
 91. For a collection of provisions just referencing the D.C. Circuit, see Eric M. Fraser 
et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 154–55 (2013). 
 92. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 307(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(a)–(b) (2012); Legomsky, supra 
note 13, at 1311–12 (discussing the INA). 
 93. 2 U.S.C. § 437h; see also Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(discussing § 437h). 
 94. E.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376, 1742 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 26(f)(2)) 
(stating that the decision regarding who gets an award of funds can be challenged in the 
court of appeals). 
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federal agencies,95 Congress left CFPB review in the federal district 
courts.96 
Few patterns emerge from the seemingly random distribution of initial 
agency review between circuit and district courts, and Congress generally, 
though not always,97 declines to explain its choice of forum.98  Even a 
cursory survey can find countless examples of similar actions by different 
agencies being challenged in different courts.  Thus, for example, though 
complex economic models are of critical importance to both, regulations of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) can be challenged 
directly in the circuit court,99 while challenges to regulations of the 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System go to the district court.100  
Review of orders of the Export-Import Bank takes place in district court,101 
while challenges to SEC orders go to the circuit court,102 though both 
regulate sophisticated trading markets.  Postal rates can be challenged in 
the circuit court,103 but Medicare reimbursement rates are reviewed by a 
district court.104  Decertified airline mechanics proceed directly to the 
circuit court,105 while decertified Navy instructors or body armor 
manufacturers go to the district court.106 
Even within an agency or a program, it is not clear why one set of 
decisions go to one forum or another.  Horse Protection Act regulations can 
be challenged in district court, but adjudications go to the circuit court.107  
 
 95. Id. § 712, 124 Stat. at 1643–44 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8302(c)(1)); 
§ 718, 124 Stat. at 1652–54 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8306(b)).  These provisions 
are likely unconstitutional.  See generally Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 
GA. L. REV. 1217 (2013). 
 96. See, e.g., Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am. v. CFPB, 907 F. Supp. 2d 112 
(D.D.C. 2012); First Premier Bank v. CFPB, 819 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.S.D. 2011).  For 
another recent example of Congress providing for different types of review in the same 
legislation, compare 47 U.S.C. § 1442(h) (district court has jurisdiction over disapproval of a 
state plan), with 47 U.S.C. § 923(i)(7) (court of appeals has jurisdiction over decision of 
dispute resolution board). 
 97. The INA is an exception.  See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 224 (1963). 
 98. Note, supra note 7, at 999; Evans, supra note 4, at 382. 
 99. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 766(c). 
 100. E.g., NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F. Supp. 2d 85 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 101. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 878 F. Supp. 2d 42 
(D.D.C. 2012), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank of the 
U.S., 718 F.3d 974 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 103. 39 U.S.C. § 3663. 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f). 
 105. 49 U.S.C. § 46110. 
 106. Foster v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.D.C. 2012); Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. 
United States, 2012 WL 2994111 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2012). 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b).  There are many similar circumstances that would likely exist, 
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The rule is flipped for the Department of Energy, where regulations under 
the Energy Policy Act can be challenged in the circuit court,108 while 
determinations of entitlement to Energy Star designation are brought in 
district court.109  FTC rules that purport to amend trade regulations go to 
the circuit court, while FTC rules that interpret trade regulations go to the 
district court—although both have the same practical effect on regulated 
parties.110  If the government prevents you from boarding an airplane, your 
forum depends on whether the Transportation Security Administration or 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation placed you on the no-fly list.111 
Sometimes, Congress provides for circuit court review only for particular 
types of litigants.  For example, Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) decisions regarding the approval of Medicaid state plans can 
generally be challenged only in district court, but a state may challenge an 
adverse approval decision directly in the court of appeals.112  And 
sometimes Congress has even given the litigant the option: electing circuit 
court review after a lengthier administrative appeal, or proceeding to 
district court after exhausting fewer than all of the administrative remedies 
available.113 
Still other times, the proper forum for challenging an agency’s decision 
might vary from year to year, or even day to day.  For example, litigants 
who wish to challenge the Department of Commerce’s actions under the 
Export Administration Act must determine whether their challenge comes 
at a time when the statute, including its circuit court review provision, is in 
effect, or whether its rules have simply been extended by Executive Order, 
which would shuttle cases to the district courts.114 
The seeming randomness of the division of initial review fora provides 
scant evidence of an intelligent design.115  Only rarely do legislative 
 
but for the judicial interpretation of “order” in direct review provisions to include 
“regulations.”  See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying text. 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b)(1). 
 109. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 679 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 110. Funeral Consumer Alliance, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 111. Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 112. Compare Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 377 (9th Cir. 2011), and Miss. 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 1983) (both discussing appeals of non-
state litigants who initially challenged Medicaid determinations in district court), with 42 
U.S.C. § 1316(a).  See also Del. Div. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., 665 F. Supp. 1104, 1109–10 (D. Del. 1987) (“Before tackling the important 
constitutional and statutory issues raised by a denial of  Medicaid funding, the Court must 
slice through a thicket of seemingly incomprehensible rules that accompany federal transfers 
to the poor . . . [including] Byzantine jurisdictional standards.”). 
 113. 25 U.S.C. § 450m-1. 
 114. Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 115. Evans, supra note 4, at 382. 
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histories shed any light on intent.  As one might expect, legislative debate 
over new agency programs tends to dwell on things other than judicial 
review procedures.116  At best, this unusual and unpredictable divide 
appears to be driven by historical circumstances, committee idiosyncrasies, 
or legislative compromises.  Or perhaps the existence of a direct circuit 
court review provision is simply the product of which piece of prior 
legislation a particular staffer happened to use as a template.  In any event, 
although there may be compelling reasons for the placement in one forum 
versus another, it appears that Congress has not given the matter much 
thought. 
Today, it is unknown whether the majority of agency actions are 
reviewed by circuit or district courts.  Commentators have variously 
assumed both circuit and district courts to have the upper hand.117  We 
tend to think that most agency decisions end up in the district court as the 
default rule.  And we’re in good company: according to the 1990 Federal 
Courts Study Committee, “administrative law experts estimate that there 
may be five to eight times as many of these cases [beginning in district 
courts] as there are direct appeals.”118  Although hundreds of agency 
actions are expressly channeled to the circuit courts, district courts remain 
the default choice for the seemingly infinite number of agency decisions for 
which no forum is specified.119  Regardless, the bottom line is that the 
modern statutory scheme oscillates between initial district court review and 
direct circuit court review in what often feels like an arbitrary fashion.120 
 
 116. Id. at 374, 376 (“Throughout the history of statutes providing for administrative 
action, the provision relating to the machinery and procedure of administrative action has 
been subordinated to the provisions relating to the policy for which administrative 
regulation was established.”). 
 117. Bryan C. Bond, Note, Taking it on the Chenery: Should the Principles of Chenery I Apply 
in Social Security Disability Cases?, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157, 2170 (2011) (circuit court); 
Jens H. Hillen, Note, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Independent Review of Patent 
Decisions and the Constitutional Facts Doctrine, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 210 (1993) (circuit court); 
Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation 
and Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 225 
n.142 (1990) (circuit court); Cal. Energy Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F.3d 1143, 1148 
(9th Cir. 2009) (district court). 
 118. Fed. Courts Study Comm., Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 22 CONN. L. 
REV. 733, 810–11 (1990). 
 119. E.g., NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Unless the 
Congress has . . . expressly supplied the courts of appeals with jurisdiction to review agency 
action directly, an APA challenge falls within the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
district court and must be brought there ab initio.”). 
 120. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at § 3941. 
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3. Judicial Gloss 
Given the complexity and lack of any discernable organizing principle of 
this divided scheme, the Supreme Court regularly resolves jurisdictional 
disputes involving review of agency action.  For the last several years, an 
average of one such jurisdictional case has appeared before the Court each 
term.121 
And if the lower courts struggle with deciphering Congress’s 
jurisdictional puzzle, it is no surprise that litigants are often unsure of where 
they should bring their challenge.  Litigants who guess incorrectly face the 
prospect of losing out on very short deadlines, often sixty days, for bringing 
an action,122 unless they are able to convince a court to transfer the case to 
the proper forum.123  Cognizant of the risks to litigants, courts openly 
advocate for challengers to agency decisions to bring their actions in both 
circuit and district courts, lest they guess wrong.124  Scholars too have noted 
the difficulty of identifying the proper forum.125 
To deal with this statutory mess, courts have experimented with 
jurisdictional tests to ease the confusion.126  However, many of these 
approaches relied more on the preferences and assumptions of the judges 
than on any direction from Congress.127  For example, in the 1980s, the 
Supreme Court suggested that direct circuit court review should be 
presumed based on what it described as “the sound policy of placing initial 
APA review in the courts of appeals.”128  But the Court made little effort to 
defend, or even articulate, its view of policy—a policy often at odds with 
Congress’s, as reflected in statutory language—and recent decisions have 
substituted the usual tools of statutory construction for these naked policy 
preferences.129 
For their part, the circuit courts have their own view of “sound policy.”  
Sometimes, circuit courts read in exceptions to statutory circuit court review 
 
 121. See supra note 3. 
 122. There are perhaps hundreds of statutes which require a petition for review to be 
filed within sixty days.  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2149(c) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2012). 
 123. See Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 124. See Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 670 F.3d 268, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 125. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 126. For a discussion of the early judicial efforts at interpreting these provisions, see 
generally McAllister, supra note 80. 
 127. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 334 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “courts 
have distorted plain statutory text in order to produce a ‘more sensible’ result” when 
interpreting statutory review provisions). 
 128. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 745 (1985); accord, e.g., Jaunich v. 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 50 F.3d 518, 521 (8th Cir. 1995); Suburban 
O’Hare Comm’n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 129. See Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012). 
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based on the nature of the claim, particularly constitutional or pattern-or-
practice challenges to agency actions,130 or the likely thoroughness of the 
administrative record.131  Other times, while simultaneously groaning about 
crushing dockets,132 circuit courts enthusiastically assume original 
jurisdiction based primarily on their own policy preferences and only 
loosely, and as an afterthought, on statutory language.133  Most egregiously, 
circuit courts occasionally assume direct review jurisdiction for themselves 
despite the lack of any statutory basis.134  Rather than clarifying matters, 
these occasional presumptions simply add another layer of indeterminacy 
upon an already uncertain jurisdictional terrain.135 
Another interpretive approach requires closer examination.  Many direct 
review statutes—particularly those adopted before 1950—provide for direct 
review of “orders.”136  Does this allow for direct circuit court review of 
regulations, or other types of agency action?137  In the 1950s, the courts 
interpreted “order” narrowly to exclude rulemaking.138  Beginning in the 
1970s, the circuit courts started interpreting “order” in direct review 
 
 130. E.g., Mace v. Skinner, 34 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 131. City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 132. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?  An Essay 
on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 761–62 (1983) 
(citing increases in dockets and case load). 
 133. E.g., Cal. Energy Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“[C]onsiderations of efficiency, consistency with the congressional scheme, and judicial 
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F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2004); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v. FERC, 
388 F.3d 903, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2004); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at § 3940. 
 134. Clark v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 170 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“[T]he statute governing judicial review in the matter before us is ambiguous, since it 
provides for judicial review but fails to specify the court in which such review will take place.  
This alone favors the location of jurisdiction in this Court.”). 
 135. Jaunich v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 50 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 
1995) (“While the analytical framework for determining whether initial review should 
proceed in the court of appeals or the district court appears somewhat simple, it is often 
complicated by confused case law standards or poorly drafted and ambiguous statutory 
language.”). 
 136. Note, supra note 7, at 989–92. 
 137. On the one hand, “order” generally is a limited, case-specific type of directive.  The 
APA, for example, defines “order” to be a final disposition “other than rule making.”  5 
U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012).  Yet the statutory use of “order” may not say much by way of 
legislative intent to limit direct review: these provisions might be anachronisms of the pre-
APA era when the scope and nature of review varied widely depending on the type of 
agency action, or they could reflect a lack of congressional foresight into the varying ways in 
which agencies would choose to act.  LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 158–59 (1965) (describing possibilities and suspecting “an 
oversight”). 
 138. Note, supra note 7, at 989–92. 
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provisions to apply to pretty much anything that the agency does—
rulemaking, manual, or any other final agency action.139 
The expansion of “order” can lead to some awkward results because 
many of the direct review provisions also contain short time windows, 
commonly sixty days, in which a suit must be brought.  The short time 
period might make sense when dealing with an adjudication leveled against 
a readily defined individual, but it makes less sense when dealing with a 
broad regulation.  For example, there may be instances where no one has 
an imminent injury from a new regulation because its application to any 
particular situation is speculative.  This is often the case with ambiguous 
regulations, the real upshot of which cannot be grasped until the agency 
moves to enforce.  Moreover, even if a challenge might meet the strictures 
of Article III, a regulated party may wish to choose to see how the 
regulation is going to be implemented or applied to it before immediately 
filing suit.  The expansion of “order” to cover any and all agency action not 
only stretches statutory text, but it can also hamper the efficient 
administration of justice. 
The recent trend, however, is to follow the language of the direct review 
provisions more literally and to interpret “order” narrowly, leaving 
challenges to other actions to the district court.140  Although courts may 
have sought to provide clarity, departing from the text of the statutory 
provisions has introduced more confusion and disparities between similarly 
worded statutes.  The upshot is that simply identifying a statutory provision 
is not enough for litigants to find a home for their challenge; they also must 
determine how the relevant courts have interpreted that particular 
provision. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has charted a new path, favoring 
clear dividing lines and easy tests for determining where an action belongs, 
rather than the unpredictable analysis of the nature of the claim.  For 
example, in Elgin v. Department of Treasury, the Supreme Court held that any 
personnel action cognizable under the Civil Service Reform Act—even a 
constitutional claim for injunctive relief against a statute—can only be 
brought directly to the Federal Circuit.141  This was a clear improvement 
over decades of circuit case law that instead scrutinized the nature of the 
claim before allowing some to proceed in district court.142  As the Elgin 
Court emphasized, the discarded claim-based jurisdictional rule “would 
 
 139. See, e.g., Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d 593, 598–600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) advisory circular is an “order” for 
purposes of a statutory review provision); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309 
(8th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases). 
 140. E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 141. 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012); see also Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012). 
 142. See, e.g., Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 229–30 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
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deprive the aggrieved employee, the [agency], and the district court of clear 
guidance about the proper forum for the employee’s claims at the outset of 
the case.”143 
In sum, despite the courts’ efforts, the United States Code remains a 
complicated maze for would-be challengers of agency action, largely 
providing for judicial review but varying unpredictably the forum in which 
the review will take place. 
II. WHICH COURT(S) SHOULD REVIEW THE EXECUTIVE? 
Congress may not carefully consider its jurisdictional choices, but that 
need not stop us from giving the question a close look.  In this Part, we 
catalog the various arguments that have been or might be offered to 
support a particular jurisdictional scheme.  Given the frequency with which 
circuit courts are charged with direct review of an agency decision, we 
would expect that the benefits of direct review would be well established.  
But they are not.144  To fill the gap, we utilize and expand prior scholarship 
on the structure of judicial hierarchies, and we ask which jurisdictional 
system achieves the optimal balance between accuracy and cost, while also 
taking into account other factors that may be relevant to the design of the 
ideal system.  We ultimately conclude that broad claims in favor of initial 
circuit court review are unsupported at present. 
We identify several arguments that could be raised in favor of direct 
circuit court review: the need to distribute workload, the unsuitability of 
district court rules for reviewing agency decisions, the need for authoritative 
resolution of legal disputes, seemliness, efficiency of a direct route to the 
court of appeals, and accuracy.  Many of these arguments—most notably, 
seemliness and authoritativeness—are at best only arguments for circuit 
court involvement at some stage in the case, such as on appeal, and say 
nothing by their own force about whether that role should be at the 
beginning or the end of a case.  Only efficiency and accuracy plausibly 
justify a case proceeding directly to the court of appeals, and then only 
under assumptions that we think are unlikely to hold true in reality. 
No balancing would be complete without considering the costs of 
jurisdictional ambiguity.  And these costs, in our view, are fatal to the 
current design.  Rather than attempt to chase uncertain marginal gains by 
tailoring jurisdiction based on guesses about the future, we propose a single, 
uniform standard to simplify matters for future litigants.  At the very least, 
we urge efforts to seek simple, predictable rules. 
 
 143. Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2135. 
 144. But see Currie & Goodman, supra note 13. 
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A. Legitimacy/Seemliness 
A surprisingly persistent argument in favor of circuit court involvement is 
seemliness: the perceived legitimacy of judicial review depends on the 
availability of a court of appeals.145 
This argument falters on several levels.  On the definitional level, 
“seemliness” is a particularly squishy concept,146 and advocates of this 
perspective have done little to impart substance or justify why it should 
matter.147  Our best effort to construct the argument is that (1) a major goal 
of the judicial system should be to convince litigants and the public that 
justice is being served, and (2) litigants or the public might view a district 
judge reviewing an administrative agency as somehow illegitimate or less 
legitimate.  While the former premise is debatable, the latter is wholly 
unjustified. 
First, the supposed unseemliness of district court review would seem to 
be resolved by the availability of the circuit court to conduct appellate 
review.  If litigants would not credit the say of a single district judge, they 
could invoke their right to appeal and have their chance to proceed in the 
circuit court. 
But perhaps the availability of eventual review by a circuit court would 
not solve the problem.  Perhaps “it would be unseemly and demeaning for 
a single district judge to set aside the decisions of an expert administrative 
agency . . . .”148  The prospect of appeal, one could argue, does not cure the 
initial indignity of an agency being forced to answer to a single judge, nor 
does it eliminate the disrespect from a single judge setting aside a duly 
enacted regulation.  The harm is done, so goes the argument, even if the 
agency later receives the respect it deserves through an encounter with the 
circuit court. 
This line of reasoning seems almost self-refuting.  After all, district judges 
can enjoin acts of Congress and state legislation, and review in these 
situations would seem to raise even more powerful concerns with 
 
 145. Schorr, supra note 13, at 797 (“[T]he high stature of the court of appeals generally 
makes it the preferred forum . . . .”); Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 14. 
 146. Supporters of the Administrative Orders Review Act argued that seemliness 
required the rejection of three-judge district court review in favor of single-tier, three-judge 
circuit court review.  Hearings, supra note 83, at 112 (“[I]f we were going to take away appeals 
of right, there ought to be hearings by the court of appeals.”).  Thus, according to the 
promoters of the Act, seemliness requires the right to proceed in a court called a “court of 
appeals.”  This nomenclature preference is hardly a solid basis on which to base a 
jurisdictional system.  We think a more persuasive—but still unconvincing—iteration would 
be that seemliness is satisfied by a multi-membered court but not a single judge. 
 147. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 14. 
 148. Id. 
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seemliness.149  If it is unseemly for a district judge to second-guess an 
administrative body, how should we feel about a single district judge 
striking down federal or state legislation as unconstitutional?  The 
seemliness argument would erode judicial review by district courts to the 
vanishing point.150 
At any rate, today’s system involves numerous agency decisions subject 
to review without widespread alarm over the system’s legitimacy.  As an 
empirical matter, we are just not convinced that many litigants, be they 
agencies or challenging parties, feel review by a district court is somehow 
beneath them. 
Not only do we doubt that litigants would question the legitimacy of 
initial district court review, but we question how much weight litigant 
preferences should be given.  The mere fact that things were previously 
done a certain way is not a sufficient reason to continue down the same 
path.  The bar may be programmed by experience to expect a certain 
jurisdictional scheme, but lawyers, particularly the specialized breed that 
practice administrative law, can adapt.  Indeed, for many years in this 
country, the idea that a single judge could issue final, unappealable rulings 
was common.151  In fact, there have been a number of serious—though 
controversial—proposals to limit circuit court appellate review of district 
court judgments,152 and some have suggested that litigants should have less 
 
 149. Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District 
Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101 (2008). 
 150. An interesting twist on this argument was recently articulated by Aaron-Andrew 
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exercise of judicial review (i.e., in a way that accords little deference to agency calls).  See id. 
at 743–48.  If a main argument in favor of judicial deference is that the President and his 
agents, as politically elected and accountable policymakers, are entitled to a significant 
degree of latitude within statutory bounds, then it might follow that politically vetted judges 
have a stronger claim to judicial review that tinkers with national policy.  Id.  From this 
perspective, the Supreme Court has the strongest claim, sounding in political or democratic 
pedigree, to revisit agency interpretations, at least when those interpretations implicate 
national policy.  Id.  District courts ought to be the most deferential under this rubric, with 
the circuit courts occupying a middle ground.  Id. 
 151. Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603 (1985). 
 152. E.g., Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 40 
Fed. Reg. 27,925, 27,927 (1975); accord, e.g., David R. Cleveland, Post-Crisis Reconsideration of 
Federal Court Reform, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 47, 60 (2013); Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review 
During Immigration Reform: The Certificate of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499 (2008); Immigration 
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1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 12 (1996); Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Asks Limit to Automatic Appeals, 
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of an expectation of having a two-tier judiciary when it comes to review of 
agency decisions.153  We see little risk of the public losing faith in the 
judiciary were administrative cases assigned to the same track as all other 
matters. 
B. Workload Distribution 
Dividing initial review between district and circuit courts could also be a 
response to a labor shortage.  Lawsuits challenging agency decisions 
account for a decent share of the federal docket,154 and some of them can 
be quite labor-intensive.  If Congress felt that district judges were, 
compared to their colleagues on the circuit courts, facing heavier dockets, 
then Congress might see fit to balance the scales by shifting some cases to 
the circuit courts.  The impetus here would not be the notion that circuit 
courts are more competent, but simply that they have a surplus of labor 
resources compared to the district courts. 
Although we have not identified evidence that Congress had this in mind 
with respect to any of its allocation choices, there is evidence that this could 
have been a factor.  In 1930, there were sixty-four case filings—not just 
administrative law cases, but cases of all stripes—per circuit judge, while 
there were nearly one thousand per district judge.155  As Figure 1 shows, 
the ratio has become much less lopsided over the years.  As it now stands, 
the ratio of district court filings to circuit court filings is in the 
neighborhood of two to one. 
Correlation is not causation, much less evidence of Congress’s 
motivation.  That being said, it does not seem entirely far-fetched to 
suppose that some members of Congress were aware of the uneven 
workloads and sought to correct that asymmetry by tinkering with the 
jurisdictional scheme.  For instance, although the legislative history of the 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/16/us/rehnquist-asks-
limit-to-automatic-appeals.html. 
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 155. COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, 
FINAL REPORT 14 TBL. 2-3 (1998), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/ 
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Administrative Orders Review Act does not suggest this rationale,156 it is 
possible that it was in the back of lawmakers’ minds.  Even in 1950, when 




 But whether or not Congress was trying to balance workloads, the 
problem is that it seems like such an odd way for Congress to respond.  If 
Congress felt district judges were swamped, why not just create more 
judgeships?158  Jurisdictional choices last much longer than the cyclical ebbs 
and flows of case filings, making them a particularly awkward method of 
balancing work between the courts.  For example, perhaps in 1930 it made 
sense to shift workload to the relatively underworked circuit courts.  But 
things have changed since 1930, and during the past three decades, 
commentators have widely complained that the circuit courts are 
overwhelmed with work.159  Yet direct review statutes exacerbate this 
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problem by committing circuit court resources to every direct review case 
that is filed. 
C.  District Court Rulemaking 
One argument that could be made in favor of direct circuit court review 
is that district court procedures are ill-suited to the review of agency 
decisions.160  “Although appeals of federal agency decisions are generally 
heard by federal district courts, they do not fit comfortably within the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”161  This is largely because the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rules) are built to resolve factual disputes.  
But there are usually no factual disputes in APA cases—only legal 
arguments about the agency’s fact-finding.  Thus, for example, discovery is 
contemplated through rules requiring mandatory disclosures and a 
scheduling conference,162 but under the APA, the record is the one 
compiled by the agency, not a new one created before the court.163  
Without a better approach available, courts generally resort to resolving 
APA cases through cross-motions for summary judgment.  Although 
effective, this approach can tempt courts into misapplying the summary 
judgment standard (are there genuine issues of material fact?) instead of the 
APA standard (is the agency view arbitrary and capricious based on the 
evidence that it had before it at the time of the decision?).  Indeed, because 
there are no factual disputes, even a complaint and answer are unnecessary 
distractions in APA cases, which is why sophisticated courts waive the 
answer and allow parties to proceed directly to briefing on the merits.  Trial 
lawyers and judges who are accustomed to discovery but unaccustomed to 
administrative review may struggle to reconcile the diverging standards.164 
In contrast, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are well-tailored to 
the appellate-like quality of APA cases.  In fact, the appellate rules contain 
several rules specifically tailored to administrative cases.165  These rules 
contemplate a straightforward briefing schedule based on the 
administrative record, exactly as the APA contemplates. 
In a typical case, then, the appellate rules may be a better match for 
review under the APA.  But there are times when the agency’s 
 
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1673 (2005); POSNER, supra note 1. 
 160. We are grateful to Matt Lawrence for this point. 
 161. W. Cory Haller & Karen E. Robertson, Untangling Federal Administrative Appeals 
Practice in the District of Colorado, COLO. LAW., March 2013, at 31. 
 162. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 163. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). 
 164. Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 204 
(1974) (“And while the district court could act like a court of appeals by deciding motions for 
summary judgment, there is always a disruptive potential for lengthy trial . . . .”). 
 165. FED. R. APP. P. 15–20. 
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administrative record is not controlling, and the comparatively robust civil 
rules make district courts the premiere triers of fact.  To the extent that 
facts are at play in an administrative review case, we think the district 
courts’ advantage here would be dispositive.166  And often facts are at play.  
First, a litigant must establish the requisite standing, which in turn requires 
that the litigant establish an injury “in fact,” an increasingly important 
aspect of judicial review since the time of Professors Currie and Goodman’s 
analysis.167  Factual disputes regarding a party’s standing often cannot be 
assessed on the administrative record.168  Second, although there is a 
presumption that the record supplied by the agency is complete, the 
challenging party may overcome this presumption with clear evidence that 
the record fails to include documents or materials considered by the agency 
in reaching its decision.169  In district court, such disputes are handled 
through the familiar tool of a motion to compel.170  In at least some circuit 
courts, however, the parties are directed to brief these issues right along 
with the merits.  The problem with this approach, of course, is that 
challenging parties presumably need this information to make their case on 
the merits.  Moreover, if a party seeks preliminary relief before the agency 
has had time to submit a record—a common tactic by plaintiffs—the court 
will have to balance whatever evidence is available at the time to determine 
whether agency action should be stayed.  Finally, the Supreme Court itself 
has suggested, though never held, that there may be due process issues if a 
litigant lacks an opportunity to develop facts necessary to a constitutional 
claim by depriving him of a district court forum,171 although subsequent 
decisions have sharply limited these suggestions.172  These situations should 
be relatively rare, but when they arise, district courts are natural candidates 
to resolve the factual issues. 
Of course, statutes could provide express mechanisms for referring 
factual disputes to an appropriate arbiter of facts, such as a district court, a 
special master, or the agency.173  Indeed, at least one statute providing for 
 
 166. See Elias, supra note 13, at 1016. 
 167. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992); see infra Part II.D.–F. 
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MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 170. See, e.g., Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 
2010). 
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 173. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at § 3943. 
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direct circuit court review expressly contemplates referral of factual disputes 
to district court.174  But these processes are likely more awkward, leading to 
considerable delay, than simply having the district court step in to resolve 
any factual disputes in the first place.175 
Although district court procedures may, at present, be clumsy when it 
comes to most administrative cases, this can and should be changed.  
Indeed, it is surprising that the Civil Rules have persisted virtually oblivious 
to the uniqueness of record review cases despite the large number of such 
cases that come before the district courts.  Nevertheless, many districts 
have, by local rule, recognized that record review cases require different 
procedures than run-of-the-mill cases.  Many, but not all, local rules 
categorically excuse record review cases from formulating a discovery 
plan.176  The District of Colorado has a distinct set of rules for 
administrative cases that appropriately bypasses discovery and proceeds 
directly to a briefing schedule.177  Even within the confines of the Civil 
Rules, district judges can exercise their discretion to modify the procedures 
to tailor them to the APA case before them.  Although these efforts vary 
from district to district and judge to judge, they point a path toward better 
district court accommodation of administrative cases. 
D. Authoritativeness 
Another common argument for direct circuit court review relies on a 
cited need for authoritative resolution of the challenge.178  Circuit courts, 
under this argument, are fewer in number, generally cover a broader 
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geographical region, and, under the law of the circuit doctrine, issue 
authoritative decisions which are binding law on all judges in the circuit 
absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention.  According to Currie and 
Goodman, “the decisive advantage of the court of appeals is its capacity to 
develop and maintain a coherent, reliable and uniform case law for a fairly 
large geographical region.”179  This argument has only limited traction. 
To begin, the relative authoritativeness of circuit courts is helpful only 
when an agency decision will generate more than a single suit.  Once the 
judiciary resolves a challenge to an agency’s fact-laden denial of benefits to 
a particular individual, for example, there is closure on that particular 
dispute through ordinary application of res judicata.  It matters not whether 
such an individualized matter is settled with fanfare by the Supreme Court 
or through an unappealed judgment from an obscure magistrate; the 
precedential effect of the decision for other cases has no bearing on the 
conclusiveness of the judiciary’s resolution of the particular challenge that 
was brought.  When no further challenges are expected, there is little value 
in creating binding precedent on the specific agency decision being 
challenged. 
But certain types of agency decisions may apply broadly—rulemaking, 
for example, may affect millions—and multiple challenges may be 
expected.  It serves no one’s interest if the judiciary has to resolve anew 
hundreds of individual challenges to the same regulation.  Not only is it 
costly to redo the same legal analysis over and over again, but the risk of 
differing results depending on which judge or judges happen to be assigned 
undermines confidence in the rule of law and violates the norm of equal 
justice.180  Differing rulings can also throw a regulatory regime into chaos.  
For agency decisions subject to multiple and possible future challenges, the 
judiciary can speak authoritatively on the permissibility of the agency 
decision only through creating precedent.181  Circuit courts, based on their 
comparatively broader geographical scope, fewer numbers, and stronger 
rules of precedent (published circuit court opinions bind future panels of 
that court), are better able to issue definitive rulings than the geographically 
limited and numerous district courts.182  Rules of cross-circuit 
 
 179. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 15. 
 180. Mead, supra note 30, at 812–13.  Bruhl considers this to be another justification for 
deference in the lower courts but not in the Supreme Court.  If lower courts, and especially 
district courts, did not grant significant deference to agency interpretations, national 
regulatory policy would be severely threatened.  On the other hand, because the Supreme 
Court’s ruling is binding on the whole nation, the concern over uniformity does nothing to 
justify deference by our highest court.  Bruhl, supra note 18, at 749. 
 181. Consolidation before a single court would work to conclusively resolve all currently 
pending cases but would not bind future litigants. 
 182. Mead, supra note 30. 
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consolidation, such as that contained in the Administrative Orders Review 
Act, or limited venue, such as the Clean Air Act’s channeling of all 
challenges to the D.C. Circuit,183 further facilitate uniform and conclusive 
decisionmaking.  However, it bears noting that nothing would prohibit 
district courts from benefiting from the same types of procedures.184 
The purported finality of circuit court rulings is, in many ways, illusory.  
True, the circuit court will, absent Supreme Court intervention, finally 
resolve the particular controversy between the agency and the challenging 
party.  But there are a dozen regional circuits, which often gives rise to 
inter-circuit disagreements.  When one circuit upholds a regulation, but 
another strikes it down, the status of the agency’s rule is particularly 
uncertain.185  Further, even within a circuit, the conclusiveness of circuit 
law is undermined by the ability of motivated jurists to distinguish prior 
cases, often on dubious grounds.186  Moreover, agencies have legal 
authority to refuse to follow circuit law to which they object, although 
subsequent challenges to agency non-acquiescence in circuits with adverse 
precedent should be pre-ordained victories for the challengers.187 
Only by placing review in a single court,188 as is often done with the D.C. 
Circuit,189 can Congress actually provide any measure of uniformity in 
decisionmaking.190  Such concentration of review has some advantages.  In 
particular, agencies have a better idea who will be reviewing their decisions 
and can tailor their decisionmaking process to the law of that circuit and 
 
 183. Fraser et al., supra note 91; see also S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 41 (1970) (citing the 
desire for “even and consistent national application”). 
 184.  Congress could designate a single district court to hear all challenges nationwide to 
agency action, as it previously did with mandamus jurisdiction and the District of Columbia 
district court; if this district court adopted a rule of precedent, and no appeal were available, 
then its review of an agency’s rule would enjoy even greater weight than that of a regional 
circuit today. 
 185. Cross, supra note 41, at 1249 (“[A] circuit split over the regulations of the 
Environmental Protection Agency . . . on granting Clean Air Act variances kept those rules 
‘in limbo for well over two years and led to different treatment of polluters in different parts 
of the country.’”). 
 186. Mead, supra note 30, at 798. 
 187. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989). 
 188. Note that it is irrelevant whether this court is designated as a circuit, district, or 
something else. 
 189. Fraser et al., supra note 91. 
 190. Landis, supra note 4, at 1087 (“The purpose of thus centralizing review over actions 
always national in their scope and involving a consideration of the interrelation of other 
claimants in one integrated system of radio network seems obvious.”); S. REP. NO. 91-1196, 
at 41 (1970) (“Because many of these administrative actions are national in scope and 
require even and consistent national application, the provision specifies that any review of 
such actions shall be in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.”). 
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the peculiarities of those judges.191  It also mitigates the temptation for 
litigants to forum shop.  These advantages motivate occasional calls for a 
specialized administrative court.192 
But a single court also has serious drawbacks, and most scholars come 
out sharply against a specialized administrative court.193  Were too many 
decisions entrusted to a single court, the size of the court would have to be 
dramatically expanded, likely rendering the maintenance of a uniform 
jurisprudence impossible.194  Moreover, relying on a single court limits the 
opportunities for circuit splits to develop.  Although circuit splits cause 
headaches for litigants (“splitting” headaches, as it were), they are 
sometimes a necessary evil.  Inter-circuit dialogue can serve to tease out 
nuance that might otherwise go undetected.195  Further, excessive 
concentration can lead to a de facto specialty court, which may be overly 
confident in its knowledge and therefore exceed the proper scope of 
review196 or acquire tunnel vision that prevents the judges from looking at 
decisions from a broader perspective.197 
Closely related to authoritativeness is lawmaking.  The distinction lies in 
the subtle difference between settling particular disputes with authority, on 
 
 191. Kendrick v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Because these reviewers 
are selected at random from a large pool, to be really safe the ALJ must please the most 
demanding federal judge in the jurisdiction.”); Cross, supra note 41, at 1251–52; James Craig 
Peacock, An Anomalous and Topsy-Turvy Appellate System, 19 A.B.A. J. 11, 14–16 (1933). 
 192. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377 
(1990) (collecting authorities); O.R. McGuire, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, 22 
A.B.A. J. 197 (1936). 
 193. POSNER, supra note 1, at 148; FRIENDLY, supra note 153, at 188; Richard L. Revesz, 
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990); 
Currie & Goodman, supra note 13.  The experience of the Federal Circuit—a specialized 
appellate court that hears narrow classes of cases relating to patents, federal employees, and 
government contracts—is decidedly mixed, with no small amount of scholarly and 
practitioner skepticism of the court’s performance.  E.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The 
Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship with the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 275, 281 (2012); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? 
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004).  But see Harold 
H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 329 (1991) 
(advocating for the “creation of a new administrative court with jurisdiction over cases 
meeting certain criteria”).  Bruff’s article deserves particular mention for the comprehensive 
framework it employs to analyze the historical origins and the costs and benefits of 
specialized courts. 
 194. Fed. Courts Study Comm., supra note 118, at 810–11. 
 195. James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule 
of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 550 (2006). 
 196. The conventional wisdom is that overly eager review doomed the specialized but 
very short-lived Interstate Commerce Court.  FRIENDLY, supra note 153, at 188. 
 197. POSNER, supra note 1, at 155–60; Harold Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, 
Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 UCLA L. REV. 432, 444 (1976). 
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the one hand, and, on the other, providing guidance to the lower courts—
and in this case, administrative agencies—on what the law is.198  The 
lawmaking function of courts has been most strongly associated with 
appellate courts, and especially the Supreme Court.199  It occurs when a 
court uses the occasion of the dispute as an opportunity to refine the law or 
declare its contours with more precision.200  The relatively strong rules of 
precedent and broader geographical scope allow circuit courts to more 
readily pronounce rules of law to govern future agency decisionmaking. 
Yet the supposed need for circuit court lawmaking is, at most, a weak 
argument for direct circuit court review, as opposed to eventual review on 
appeal.  It is unlikely that a particular controversial issue will be insulated 
from circuit court review indefinitely, as a litigant will, sooner or later, file 
an appeal and allow the circuit court to announce its legal rule.  Moreover, 
lawmaking is less important in the administrative review context than in 
most cases.  Cases such as Brand X emphasize that the judiciary’s usual role 
in developing the law is shared with administrative agencies, which can 
trump the judiciary on many questions of law through delegated power 
from the legislature.201 
To recap, although it is important not to overstate the conclusiveness of 
circuit precedent, circuit courts do issue more definitive statements of law 
than district courts, and this finality can be useful when an agency decision 
applies broadly and is susceptible to multiple challenges.  However, the 
precedent-setting feature of circuit courts becomes far less useful when the 
agency decision under review is a fact-specific adjudication that applies only 
to a particular controversy—yet Congress often places this latter type of 
agency action directly in the circuit court.202 
 
 
E. Efficiency Gains 
The primary argument in favor of direct circuit court review is 
efficiency.203  For those cases that are likely to be appealed anyway, the 
argument goes, it would be wasteful, redundant, and would delay final 
 
 198. See Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 
1402 (2000) (“The Court is expected not only to determine the victor in the specific lawsuit 
before it, but also to provide standards to guide lower courts in disposing of similar 
controversies that may arise in the future.”). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005). 
 202. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2012). 
 203. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 4. 
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resolution of the matter204 to have a district judge opine on the subject 
first.205  Because both the district court and the circuit court review agency 
decisions with the same level of deference and on the same record, the 
thinking goes, there is no point in subjecting a decision to the district court 
when the circuit court will simply repeat the exercise on appeal.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court once disdainfully described a two-tier system as “wasteful 
and irrational.”206  That comment would seem to apply not only to the 
courts’ resources but also to those of litigants. 
Efficiency, however, fails to live up to its promise.  Even under its own 
terms, efficiency favors direct circuit court review only when there is a 
strong chance of eventual appeal.  Logic and experience teach us, however, 
that most cases are not destined for appeal. 
1. The Uncertain Prospects of Appeal 
Initial circuit court review is only a cost-saver when there is an appeal.207  
 
 204. E.g., Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980) (“The most obvious 
advantage of direct review by a court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a 
district court, followed by a second review on appeal.”); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, at 
§ 3943 (“Direct action in the court of appeals, moreover, is likely to prove more expeditious 
than action by a district judge followed by review in the court of appeals.”). 
 205. Gen. Elec. Uranium Mgmt. Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 764 F.2d 896, 903–04 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (“[E]xclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals avoids duplicative review and the 
attendant delay and expense involved . . . .  [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction in the 
courts of appeals promotes the congressional goals of efficiency and predictability.”); 40 Fed. 
Reg. 27,925, 27,927 (1975) (“[D]irect review by the courts of appeals, where feasible, is 
generally desirable in the interest of efficiency and economy, as respects both litigants and 
the judicial system.”); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2122, at 4 (1950) (“[T]he submission of the cases 
upon the records made before the administrative agencies will avoid the making of two 
records, one before the agency and one before the court, and thus going over the same 
ground twice.”); Levy, supra note 13, at 513 (“The most obvious and compelling reason to 
limit review [to direct circuit court review] is the savings of judicial resources.”). 
 206. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 445 (1988). 
 207. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1325–26.  It is possible that litigants would be deterred 
from bringing a petition directly to the circuit court that they would have brought to the 
district court.  This might happen in two situations.  First, if circuit courts were significantly 
more expensive to the litigant than district courts, a litigant might be more willing to file suit 
in district court (assuming jurisdiction).  This may have been a larger concern in the past 
when proximity to the court house was important, but the invention of electronic filing has 
probably equalized the financial costs of each court.  If anything, if district courts allow 
discovery when circuit courts would not, district courts could actually cost litigants more.  
Currie & Goodman, supra note 13.  Second, litigants may be wary of proceeding to the 
circuit court if they are afraid of setting a bad precedent that will bind future litigants.  This 
concern should only apply to repeat, institutional litigants; attorneys with individual clients 
are ethically bound to consider that case in isolation.  Moreover, repeat litigants, such as 
nonprofit advocacy groups, regulated businesses, and governments, face a similar dilemma 
even in the district court, as the controversy could eventually be elevated to the circuit court. 
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If no appeal is had, district court review is a clear bargain compared to 
initial circuit court review.  After all, initial circuit court review commits 
three judges’ efforts to a challenge; district court review demands only a 
single judge’s attention.  The calculus changes when an appeal is likely to 
be filed from a district judge’s ruling.  Here, the time spent in the district 
court is cumulative.  This adds not only the cost of an additional judge, but 
also requires the challenging party and the government to pay counsel to 
litigate the issues twice.  The key point is that direct review by a circuit 
court is a cost-saver only for cases that would otherwise go up on appeal; in 
all other cases, direct review by the circuit court is more expensive. 
It would be foolish to assume that all, or even most, cases will be 
appealed eventually.  Many litigants who begin in district court are content 
to end there.  This is true even for challenges to final agency action.  For 
instance, before all deportation orders were channeled to the court of 
appeals, aliens appealed around 17% of district court judgments.208  Today, 
less than 5% of district court judgments in social security cases make it to 
the court of appeals.209  Were these cases to be placed at the circuit court, 
three judges would have spent time when, under the litigants’ apparent 
preferences, one would suffice. 
Of course, we cannot know ex ante whether a particular case is going to 
be appealed, but we can make some guesses based on classes of cases.210  
Direct circuit review could be justified on costs only when there is a 
sufficiently high appeal rate.  How high is high enough?  To answer that 
question, we must compare costs between the district court and circuit 
court. 
Quantifying the costs with precision is not easy.  Even just considering 
costs to the judiciary alone, it is not as simple as treating each circuit judge 
as being as expensive as a district judge.  Circuit panels leverage micro-
economies of scale by assigning one judge to write the panel’s opinion and 
pooling law clerk analyses.211  Yet it is equally clear that circuit courts are 
pricier than district courts, as three judges still must coordinate their 
 
 208. See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1353–54, 1402 (showing appeals for only eleven out 
of sixty-six deportation cases filed in the district court in 1984). 
 209. Compare United States Courts, Table C-4 U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Terminated, by 
Nature of Suit and Action Taken, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx? 
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/C04Mar12.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (listing a total of 14,998 Social Security suits), with United States 
Courts, Table B-7, U.S. Courts of Appeals-Nature of Suit or Offense in Cases Arising From the U.S. 
District Courts, by Circuit, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx? 
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/B07Mar12.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (listing a total of 570 Social Security appeals). 
 210. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1326. 
 211. Id. 
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schedules, read briefs, attend oral argument, and otherwise spend the time 
to become sufficiently familiar with the case to render a judgment.212  In 
other words, circuit courts spend between one and three “judge units” on 
each case.213 
Making a precise comparison between the costs to courts is neither 
possible nor wise, but it is possible to make a rough estimate.  Using data 
available from the United States Courts website,214 we approximate relative 
time costs by comparing the ratio of cases per authorized judgeship at each 
level.215  In 2012, there were 550 cases filed in district court per district 
judge, and 321 circuit cases per circuit judge.  We assume that, on average, 
district and circuit judges spend an equal amount of time on resolving cases 
(that is, judges in one tier are not lazier than another).216  Yet each district 
 
 212. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 13 (arguing that district courts can be more 
readily expanded than circuit courts based on their view that circuit courts cannot be 
expanded beyond nine judges and effectively maintain a uniform jurisprudence).  Whatever 
merit this contention may have as a matter of theory, it bears little relation to the realities of 
modern life, where circuit courts regularly exceed nine judges.  The Ninth Circuit, in fact, 
has twenty-nine active judges.  United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, The 
Judges of this Court in Order of Seniority, USCOURTS.GOV (Dec. 1, 2014), http://cdn.ca9.us 
courts.gov/datastore/uploads/general/judgeWeb.pdf. 
 213. Circuit judges are slightly more costly than district judges in financial terms as well: 
circuit judges get paid slightly more and enjoy an extra law clerk compared to district judges.  
See United States Courts, Judicial Salaries Since 1968, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialCompensation/judicial-salaries-since-1968.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2015) (listing 2015 salaries as $201,100 for district judges and $213,230 for 
circuit judges); Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of Citation 
Practices in the Federal Appellate Courts, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 51, 71–72 (describing 
the increase in clerk resources for circuit judges).  From the taxpayer’s perspective, this 
would also need to be included in the calculus. 
 214. United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 215. This is, admittedly, an imperfect measure.  We consider cases filed rather than 
resolved on the merits because district courts often spend considerable effort on cases before 
settlement.  See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Secs. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
(chronicling more than three years of complex litigation before a settlement was reached).  
Moreover, some authorized judgeships are left vacant.  See Heckler & Koch, Inc. v. Li, No. 
1:09–cv–0748–WTL–JMS, 2009 WL 4842843, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2009) (discussing 
vacancies in two districts).  And some work at each level is performed by senior judges who 
do not count toward the number of authorized judgeships.  Ruggero J. Aldisert, A 
Nonagenarian Discusses Life as a Senior Circuit Judge, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 183, 188 (2013).  
Nevertheless, we assume that these variables are not skewed in favor of one court or another.  
One factor that probably understates the cost of circuit courts is the practice of district judges 
sitting by designation and helping with the appellate workload.  However, we think our 
approach provides a rough approximation of relative cost. 
 216. In reality, of course, one case may be easy, and one may be hard, and circuit courts 
may spend their time on different matters than district judges.  But the goal here is to 
compare how much time is spent on each case on average, not how that time is allocated 
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judge is assigned more cases than each circuit judge.  This means that 
circuit courts are devoting more “judge-units” to each case than district 
courts, as we would expect.  To quantify this, in 2012, circuit courts were 
spending 1.7 judges per case for every 1 judge per case spent by district 
courts.  This makes district courts about 58% as expensive as circuit courts.  
This figure is not too far away from a prior effort, which estimated that 
district court resolution of a case is 1/3 cheaper than circuit courts based on 
a rough assumption of how circuit courts spend their time.217  These 
estimates require an appeal rate of at least 33–42% to warrant direct circuit 
court review. 
So far, we have treated the cost of circuit court review as a constant 
variable, regardless of whether it is acting in an original or appellate 
capacity.  But this assumption might not hold true in reality.  A circuit 
court could spend less time on matters when acting in an appellate 
capacity, since it could be guided by the opinion of the district judge.  Or, 
as we explore in greater detail below, a circuit court also might give appeals 
from district judges less rigorous review if it is satisfied that the challenger 
has already been treated to substantial Article III review.  This could be the 
case despite the appellate court’s recitation of a de novo standard of review 
vis-à-vis the district court decision.218  On the other hand, cases that have 
completed their run through the district court but remain in contention on 
appeal might be more difficult cases that require extra effort.219 
The analysis up to this point has primarily focused on the costs to the 
judiciary.  But, of course, the litigants’ costs are worth something too.  In a 
prior age, physical proximity to the courthouse was an important factor, 
making district courts a cheaper forum.220  Today, however, electronic 
filing and the ease of travel make the costs of litigating an administrative 
case approximately the same regardless of forum.  Yet it is considerably 
more expensive to litigate a matter in two courts rather than one.  Granted, 
 
among cases or activities.  However, to the extent that administrative review cases are more 
or less expensive than an average case at one level or another, then that could affect the 
comparison.  Administrative review cases might be more costly than the average district 
court case because there are more difficult legal issues, and they are less likely to settle, or 
they might be cheaper because there is a more streamlined process that does not require 
discovery, extensive motion practice, and a trial. 
 217. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 9. 
 218. As scholars have noted in a variety of contexts, the actual content of a given 
standard is not always reflected in its name.  See, e.g., Nicholas A. Fromherz, A Call for Stricter 
Appellate Review of Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 
527, 530 (2012) (“[W]hile the stakes are similar to class certification rulings and the standard 
of review is ostensibly the same (abuse of discretion), appellate courts actually give much 
more deference to district court decisions concerning [forum non conveniens].”). 
 219. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1326. 
 220. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13. 
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it probably is not twice as expensive, since a litigant can re-use much of the 
prior district court filings on appeal.  When calculating the relative costs of 
the courts, the cost to the litigant should also be considered along with the 
cost to the judiciary.  Thus, we need to take into account litigant costs from 
the original and subsequent fora and the possibility that circuit costs differ 
depending on the capacity in which the circuit court acts. 
Beyond the question of cost is the question of time.  All else being equal, 
a speedier process is preferable to a lengthier one.  The Supreme Court has 
suggested that this is, or ought to be, a key motivator in the design of the 
jurisdictional scheme: “The most obvious advantage of direct review by a 
court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a district court, 
followed by a second review on appeal.”221  Similarly, Congress identified 
speed as the main reason for the first direct review statute of the FTC.222  
But, again, this rationale kicks in only if an appeal is likely.  If Congress has 
guessed wrong as to which sorts of cases are likely to be appealed—and, 
truth be told, it does not appear that Congress has made much of a guess at 
all—then time-savings are not realized. 
In fact, it is possible that routing the wrong cases to the circuit court for 
direct review could translate to a longer process.223  The circuit court could 
take longer to decide the case, or, as the Supreme Court has observed, 
there can be enormous delay if the circuit court has to remand an issue to 
the agency to develop facts.224  This question is ultimately an empirical one, 
and it is a question that has thus far gone without much study.  Statistics 
compiled by the federal government shed light on the average duration of 
all civil cases in both the district and circuit courts, suggesting that slightly 
more time passes from filing to disposition in the district court than in the 
circuit court.225  But these differences might not hold true for suits 
challenging agency actions, so the question remains: From the time of 
 
 221. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980); see also WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 88, at § 3943 (stating that direct circuit court review would likely be faster than 
two-tiered review). 
 222. H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.). 
 223. Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1336 (“Direct court of appeals review can even prolong 
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 224. Harrison, 446 U.S. at 593–94. 
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Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts. 
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filing, would direct review cases last longer in the circuit court or in the 
district court?  We hesitate to offer a guess.  Without an answer based on 
data, however, the time-savings rationale is a shaky foundation on which to 
build the case for direct review by circuit courts. 
One final note is that even if efficiency favors direct circuit court review 
in some subsets of cases, the current system does a poor job in identifying 
cases with a strong appeal potential and those that lack it.  In fact, Congress 
seems to get it backwards with some frequency.  Petitions to review 
immigration cases, for example, inundate circuit courts, despite the relative 
lack of care, and, often, merit, put into the challenges and the estimated low 
chance of appeal if they were they placed in the district court in the first 
instance.226  Meanwhile, challenges to Department of Education and 
DHHS regulations—strong candidates for appeals given the amount of 
money and important issues of policy at stake—begin their judicial journey 
at the district court.227 
2. Triage 
Not only does district court review screen out a large number of cases 
from the circuit courts, but it also allows circuit courts to spend less time on 
cases that are ultimately appealed.228  Although circuit courts are supposed 
to engage in de novo review on appeals, they may be satisfied by the review 
that has already happened and be somewhat more relaxed in their ultimate 
review.  A good example of this is the unpublished opinion: under the 
current system, although appeals are technically available as of right, circuit 
courts often resolve appeals through non-precedential, unpublished 
opinions.229  The premise behind these unpublished decisions is that circuit 
judges cannot spend sufficient time or care on them to be confident in the 
outcome.230  Judges have referred to unpublished dispositions as “junk” 
law231 and “not safe for human consumption.”232  By choosing which 
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appeals deserve the full, precedential treatment and which get a more 
cursory review, circuit courts triage their resources to the issues where 
precedential rulings are needed.233 
Thus, combining the certiorari-like aspect of appellate procedure with 
initial district court review would provide for full circuit court treatment of 
an issue only when (1) the parties view it as sufficiently important to appeal, 
and (2) the circuit court decides to spend enough time on the case to write a 
precedential opinion.  Although circuit courts can write non-precedential 
opinions even on direct review, they may be more willing to do so if one 
Article III judge has already given the case a close look.  Whether allowing 
circuit courts to shirk their review is a good thing or a bad thing is a 
complicated question.234  From a pure cost perspective, though, the benefits 
are palpable.  If a chief concern in all this is unnecessary duplication, or 
doubt that there “should be two tiers of review of identical scope of the 
administrative decision,”235 then a standard of appellate review that is not 
quite de novo may actually make sense. 
F. Accuracy 
Although there is a long-running debate over what the ultimate goals of 
a judicial system should be, accuracy, however defined, is regularly among 
the top values.236  Accuracy, however, would likely be improved by the 
inclusion of district courts in the judicial process in administrative review 
cases, as arguments are the better for having been screened by a district 
judge and matured during an added tier of litigation.  Only under very 
narrow circumstances—high district court error, low circuit court error, 
and low rates of appeal of those particular matters—would accuracy favor 
direct circuit court review.  As we explain, this alignment of variables is 
likely very rare.  Thus, rather than supporting direct circuit court review, 
the accuracy argument favors administrative cases being placed on the 
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 235. Groves v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 236. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values 
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475–91 (1986) (discussing the core values in our 
judicial system); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
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same judicial path as every other case. 
1. Unappealed Erroneous District Court Rulings 
So far, we have largely credited the litigant’s appeal preferences as a key 
determinant of the preferred court.  However, to the extent that the 
ultimate goal of a judicial system is to improve accuracy, relying on litigant 
appeal preferences will often fall short.237 
A litigant’s wish for a circuit court ruling does not necessarily imply that 
it is socially beneficial to grant it.238  Nor is it necessarily fair or just to 
assign a litigant to a lengthier and more costly appeal process because that 
process will dissuade an appeal.239  A litigant’s incentives are not necessarily 
aligned with those of society, and, therefore, her appeal preferences should 
not be treated as conclusive.240  This difficulty is compounded by the fact 
that litigants might not correctly identify which decisions are likely to be 
reversed on appeal.241 
Giving undue weight to the likelihood of appeal can lead to a less 
accurate system under the right conditions.242  For example, consider a case 
that is likely to be botched by the district court but likely to be fixed by the 
court of appeals.  If the litigants were to accept the error rather than to 
appeal (whether they are deterred by high transaction costs or information 
costs), then placing that dispute directly in the circuit court would lead to a 
more accurate outcome, so long as the circuit court will reach the correct 
outcome on direct review. 
There are two problems with using this possibility as a basis for system 
design.  First, we think this scenario will be fairly rare.  As we unpack 
below, there is little empirical or theoretical reason to think that district 
courts are erring at rates significantly higher than circuit courts.  Moreover, 
a priori, we would expect litigants to more readily appeal from erroneous 
district court decisions where they believe they can obtain a reversal from 
the circuit court, although efforts to model or study litigant appeal behavior 
are so far inconclusive.243 
 
 237. Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selection, 
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379, 387 (1995). 
 239. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 18. 
 240. Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 237. 
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 242. Shavell, supra note 238; Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 237. 
 243. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 
1457, 1512, 1514 (2003); Shavell, supra note 238, at 390; Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. 
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Second, when designing a system ex ante, it will be difficult or impossible 
to identify situations where district courts are getting it “wrong” and circuit 
courts are getting it “right.”  Even assuming that these concepts have any 
coherence as a theoretical matter, there is unlikely to be a consensus on 
measurement for quite some time.  Simply looking at circuit court reversal 
rates, for instance, would tell you that circuit and district courts are 
reaching different outcomes, but it would not tell you whether it was the 
district court that was erring or the circuit court.  In fact, this is one of the 
key criticisms of empirical legal scholarship: Because it is difficult to code 
content, empiricists have placed inordinate weight on outcomes.244 
a. Comparative Personnel 
Much of the pretext behind the case for direct circuit review is that the 
judges who staff appellate courts are, on balance, smarter or otherwise 
“better” at judging than their district court counterparts.245  We are quite 
doubtful of this proposition as an empirical matter, given the impressively 
high quality of the federal judiciary as a whole.246  If anything, the less 
political nature of the district judge selection process could indicate that 
merit plays a greater role in who is appointed to the bench, which in turn 
would suggest higher quality district judges.247 
But apart from pure “smarts,” it may be that circuit judges, through 
experience, form an expertise that makes them better suited to review 
administrative actions.  As the intermediate appellate courts, circuit judges 
spend their days reviewing the work of others.248  In contrast, district judges 
 
Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 650–51 (2000). 
 244. Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of 
Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 885 (2008). 
 245. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 12 (emphasizing the capacity for superior 
decisionmaking); Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Trial and Appellate Judges: How Do They Differ?, 36 
W. POL. Q. 570, 570 (1983) (“Conventional wisdom suggests that the more prestigious U.S. 
Courts of Appeals will be staffed by judges who are ‘better’ trained and more ‘qualified’ in 
several respects than their counterparts on the U.S. District Courts.”). 
 246. Oldfather, supra note 229, at 330–31 (“At least in the federal courts, nothing about 
the process by which judges are selected or the terms under which they serve suggests that 
judges on appellate courts are inherently more competent than trial judges at resolving legal 
issues.”). 
 247. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 11 (2013) 
(concluding that ideology does not play as large a role at the district court level as in the 
higher levels of the federal judiciary). 
 248. See Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 168, at 965 (“As such, review of these cases in 
the courts of appeals is quite logical, because it is similar to what those courts usually do.”).  
However, it is important to note that judicial review of administrative decision is more 
deferential than appellate review of lower court decisions.  Even similar standards, like 
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are “more accustomed to exercising discretion, [and] less accustomed to 
reviewing its exercise . . . .”249  However, the flip side of this is that district 
judges are used to having their discretionary decisions reviewed by circuit 
courts and, thus, may be more sensitive to deferential standards.  Knowing 
what it feels like to have a discretionary decision reversed, district judges 
may be less likely to overstep their power of review.  Further, through 
assessing motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict, district 
judges are accustomed to weighing evidence to determine whether it is 
sufficient to support a jury verdict—the same standard called for by the 
substantial evidence standard of APA review.250  Non-dispositive orders of 
magistrate judges are reviewed only for clear error.251  Habeas petitions 
also call for deferential review in the case of state court decisions.252  On the 
whole, then, a district judge reviewing an agency decision under a 
deferential standard is hardly entering unfamiliar territory. 
Another possibility is that circuit judges may have an opportunity to 
develop specific expertise in the law or science applicable to the review of 
particular agency decisions.253  Because there are fewer circuit judges, 
placing review of especially complicated agency decisions in a particular 
circuit court allows those judges to learn, through repeated exposure to the 
issues, more about highly technical nuances applicable to certain agencies.  
“One of thirty district judges in a circuit can expect to hear no more than 3 
percent of the total caseload in any field; one of nine appellate judges will 
hear 33 percent of that caseload.”254  For example, the judges on the D.C. 
Circuit have, through repeated adjudication of numerous petitions for 
review of FERC orders, learned a great deal about the complicated set of 
regulations and background industry economics that are implicated in such 
 
“abuse of discretion,” are subtly different when there is court/agency review instead of 
court/court.  See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 159 (1999) (quoting Morgan v. Daniels, 
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 250. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 57, 66 (1966) (requiring 
substantial evidence); Dragich, supra note 152, at 60 (“Review for error under highly 
deferential standards of review calls for careful study of the record and established law, a 
task with which district judges are highly familiar.”). 
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cases.255  Given the greater number of district judges in any particular 
circuit, to say nothing of their tendency to work solitarily rather than 
collegially, each district judge would be unlikely to hear numerous 
challenges to FERC orders, even if Congress did give district courts 
jurisdiction in the first instance.256 
Increased judicial experience with a particular statutory scheme or 
regulatory framework could allow for a more informed review, but it also 
comes with a serious downside: judges who know an area may be more 
willing to second-guess the agency’s decision.257  Critics have long opposed 
a specialized administrative court, in part for this reason.258  Regardless of 
whether one thinks this increased experience is a good thing or a bad thing, 
however, it is only effective if there are a limited number of decisions that 
go to the circuit court.  If circuit courts were to be inundated with 
challenges to every type of agency decision, the court would either have to 
be dramatically expanded, thereby reducing the likelihood that any 
particular judge would have repeat interactions with an agency, or the 
judges would be so overwhelmed with workload from a diverse set of cases 
that they could develop expertise in nothing.259 
So far, there is little basis for thinking that circuit judges are better at 
reviewing agency decisions than district judges. 
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advantage of judicial review being limited to a smaller set of judges is that it allows for 
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 259. FRIENDLY, supra note 153, at 184–88. 
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b. Institutional Competence 
Circuit courts are generally credited with having four advantages over 
district courts: (1) as appellate bodies, we expect that there will be a 
narrowing of issues on appeal, at least if the advocates are skilled; (2) 
litigants in the circuit court can focus on briefing without the distractions of 
discovery; (3) the circuit court and the parties already have had the benefit 
of one arbiter previously working through the legal issue; and (4) they 
decide cases in sets of three.260  Notably, the first three of these no longer 
distinguish district courts from the circuit courts on direct review of agency 
decisions.  However, the benefits of collegial decisionmaking still apply.  
Professors Currie and Goodman found this to be “by far the most 
important” argument in favor of circuit court decisionmaking.261 
Collaborative decisionmaking is thought to improve the quality of 
decisionmaking by invoking the collective judgment of three judges instead 
of one and by providing a process for jurists to debate a complicated 
issue.262  The assumption that “three heads are better than one” enjoys 
support by analogy to other contexts, though empirical application to 
judicial decisionmaking is incomplete.263  Yet this advantage is also likely 
overstated, as it depends on the three judges engaging in meaningful 
deliberation over the case.264  In reality, panels often delegate primary 
responsibility for a case to a single authoring judge, with the other two 
members reading the opinion but giving the matter less than their full 
attention.265  Deliberation is not something that is easy to monitor, much 
less to police.  Nevertheless, in some particularly complicated cases, circuit 
courts depart from the typical single-judge authorship approach and 
distribute the workload among the members of the panel.266 
 
 260. Mead, supra note 30, at 823; see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 
231–32 (1991). 
 261. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 12. 
 262. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme Courts, in PROCEDURAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 26–34 (Chris Sanchirico ed., 2012) (cataloging the theorized benefits of 
collegiality); Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of 
Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 43 
(2009). 
 263. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 77 (David Klein & Gregory 
Mitchell eds., 2010) (“Though numerous scholars have extended our collective knowledge 
about the role of law in judicial choice, virtually none have paid attention to how the small 
group context of collegial court decision making might matter for understanding the 
influence of legal factors in appellate adjudication.”).  One exception is empirical evidence 
that collegial decisionmaking was more likely to find state statutes unconstitutional.  
Solimine, supra note 149, at 129–30. 
 264. Oldfather, supra note 229, at 330. 
 265. Id. 
 266. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“The 
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The implicit premise to this discussion is that deliberation is more likely 
to lead to a correct decision.  This is likely true when the various members 
of a group bring expertise, experience, or perspective on which they can 
draw to further the quest for truth.  But looking for “correctness” may be a 
fool’s errand if there is no meaningful standard to apply.  If asked to pick 
the “best” flavor of ice cream,267 a panel of experts will fare no better than 
a hungry child.  It is possible, though, that the amorphous standards that 
govern agency decisions—most notably arbitrary and capricious review—
are sufficiently without content that deliberation has no refining value.268  
We are sympathetic to this possibility, but are not yet ready to go quite that 
far. 
Beyond improving the quality of decisionmaking, collegial 
decisionmaking also ensures that at least two judges must vote to set aside 
agency action, thereby preventing a single rogue judge from throwing out 
the considered decision of an agency.269  In part, this is a numbers game.  
Assume that judges are randomly assigned to a case, which is typical, and 
that 10% of judges up for selection would issue unsupportable rulings, 
which is hypothetical.  If a single judge is the decider, there is a 10% chance 
of an unsupportable ruling.  But if a majority of a three-judge panel must 
issue a ruling, two erring judges would have to be picked.  Yet there is little 
reason to think that such a rate of district court error is common, 
particularly in light of the low rates of reversal that district courts enjoy.270  
Moreover, the would-be errant or sloppy judge is checked by the 
omnipresent threat of appeal and reversal. 
In sum, the practice of circuit courts using multiple judges to decide 
matters might improve decisionmaking, although how much is difficult to 
quantify, and whether it is worth this added cost is another question 
altogether.271  Thus, it is possible that circuit courts would be more likely 
than district courts to get certain types of decisions “right.”  We would 
expect that circuit court advantage to be at its peak in particularly complex 
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cases where the judges engage in meaningful back and forth, and each 
judge brings some measure of relevant experience or knowledge to the 
discussion.  The advantage ebbs for straightforward cases and fact-intensive 
cases, such as reviewing a fact-based adjudication about an individual’s 
entitlement to benefits or other relief.  Interestingly, however, the United 
States Code today often channels review of simple adjudications, such as 
deportation orders or airline mechanic licensure, to the court of appeals, 
even though collaboration is unlikely to be of use in these types of 
decisions.272 
Finally, note that an argument for collaborative decisionmaking is simply 
an argument for three-judge panels at whichever court happens to hear a 
case; it is agnostic as to the level of those three judges.  As noted above, 
district courts were previously directed to resolve challenges to certain 
agency decisions in three-judge panels.273  The benefits that may come with 
collaborative decisionmaking do not, by their own force, compel review in 
any particular court.274  Today, however, we are accustomed to triplets at 
the circuit court and singles at the district court. 
c. Ideology 
The advantage that collegiality gives to circuit courts must be balanced 
not only against its cost, but also against the potential ideological influences 
on circuit court decisionmaking.  If empirical evidence implies that circuit 
courts are more ideological than district courts when reviewing agency 
action, and if we believe that ideological influences are improper and, 
therefore, lead to “wrong” decisions, then the benefits of collegiality could 
be quickly overwhelmed by improper influences.  If a circuit court employs 
ideology when reviewing a non-ideological district court decision, then it 
will have introduced an error where none previously existed. 
The empirical literature in this area is increasingly deep and 
sophisticated but still incomplete.  Empiricists have repeatedly, though not 
universally, found evidence of ideological correlations in the voting 
behavior of federal judges at the Supreme Court and circuit court levels,275 
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frequently in the context of review of administrative decisions.276  For 
example, scholars have found an ideological correlation in voting behavior 
at the D.C. Circuit in EPA cases,277 review of agency health and safety 
decisions,278 application of Chevron deference,279 and arbitrary and 
capricious review.280 
Yet it is important not to overstate the strength of the ideological 
correlation.281  Even the strongest evidence of ideology’s role finds a 
relationship only in a minority of decisions.282  Authors are quick to observe 
that legal factors, such as precedent and the arguments of the parties, play a 
large—likely the largest—role in predicting case outcomes.283  Further, the 
methodologies in the empirical literature have been the subject of fierce 
criticism.  Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit noted that the studies omitted 
variables, including applicable precedent and the record before the court, 
which might also explain the voting patterns.284  Professors Epstein and 
King identified a number of methodological flaws that they believe 
undermine legal empirical work in general.285  Their conclusion was harsh: 
legal empirical scholars have been “proceeding with little awareness of, 
much less compliance with, many of the rules of inference, and without 
paying heed to the key lessons of the revolution in empirical analysis that 
has been taking place over the last century in other disciplines.”286  Other 
scholars reminded the legal academy that, even if a correlation is 
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established, correlation does not necessarily imply causation.287 
The evidence of ideology in district court decisions is considerably 
weaker and more mixed.  This may suggest that ideology plays a lesser role 
in the decisions of district judges, or it may simply be a reflection of the 
relative dearth of empirical scholarship focusing on these courts. 
There are some important theoretical reasons to believe that ideology is 
a lesser problem in the district courts.  These include (1) the more 
contentious or “difficult” nature of cases handled by the circuit courts;288 (2) 
the less visible, and thus less politically charged, confirmation process; (3) 
the use of merit-based instruments in the selection of district judges;289 and 
(4) the stronger check on ideological decisionmaking secured through 
appeal as of right in the circuit courts (compared with certiorari in the 
Supreme Court).290 
On the other hand, the autonomy enjoyed by district judges removes a 
major check on ideological decisionmaking.  Whereas a circuit judge has to 
convince at least one other colleague that her position is sound, a district 
judge has to convince nobody but herself.  All else being equal, this 
structural factor would presumably serve as an obstacle to ideological 
decisionmaking: a position that is based in part on one’s politics or 
worldview is less likely to withstand collegial scrutiny than one based on 
legally cognizable variables, like facts, law, precedent, etc.  At the very least, 
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(1995) (discussing the merit-based selection panels for district judges). 
 290. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 247, at 226 (“A district judge’s own 
ideology can be expected to influence some of his decisions, though probably only a small 
percentage because of the prospect of reversal if he deviates from the precedents established 
by and the known ideological propensities of the judges of the court of appeals for his 
circuit.”). 
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a district judge who wished to inject ideology into his decisions would seem 
to have an easier go of it, even if the effect was only temporary, given the 
possibility of reversal on appeal.  Of course, this hardly means that a 
significant number of district judges leverage this structural opportunity. 
Unfortunately, despite the theorizing, there has been far less empirical 
work on the role of ideology in the district courts.  Although the literature 
suggests that ideology may have a slightly diminished role in the district 
courts, far more study is needed to confirm this observation.291  One study 
found a difference of 10% to 13% between Democratic and Republican 
district judges for all types of cases, civil, criminal, and administrative.292  
On the other hand, this same study found a stronger correlation in the 
circuit courts.293  Similarly, in the context of religious freedom decisions, 
Professors Heise and Sisk found that politically conservative judges, 
whether hailing from the district courts or the circuit courts, were less likely 
than their liberal counterparts to credit free-exercise or accommodation 
claims.294  Again, though, the correlation was stronger with respect to 
circuit judges.295 
Though we must again stress scholars’ relative neglect of district courts, 
the balance of studies does suggest that ideology is more consistently 
imbedded in the Supreme Court and the circuit courts.296  This was echoed 
in the recent studies conducted by Richard Posner, William Landes, and 
Lee Epstein, who found that Republican circuit judges were more likely to 
issue conservative decisions than Republican district judges.297  This 
resonates with the conventional wisdom that circuit courts, and certainly 
the Supreme Court, are more like political institutions than the district 
courts. 
 
 291. It could be argued that the average issue presented to district courts is less 
controversial than those that make it up to the circuit court because litigants first persevere 
through two tiers of litigation to get a circuit opinion in their case.  Thus, the fact that circuit 
courts display a higher correlation with ideological variables simply reflects the less settled, 
and, therefore, more controversial, nature of the controversies at that level. 
 292. C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS 34 (1996). 
 293. ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 7 (1983) (“[T]he evidence for a relationship between judicial 
background variables and subsequent policy decisions is somewhat inconclusive.  Although it 
is fairly strong for appellate court judges, it is weak and inconsistent for trial jurists.”). 
 294. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of 
Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1216–17 (2012). 
 295. Id. at 1217. 
 296. Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 
469, 486–87 (1998) (collecting studies); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The 
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 273–74 (1995).  But see 
Sisk & Heise, supra note 294. 
 297. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 247, at 234. 
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Once more, the balance between the benefits of collegiality and the 
influence of ideology is an empirical question.  Yet assuming that ideology 
is present among circuit courts in certain classes of cases, we might want to 
limit circuit court involvement in those cases.  Thus, politically charged 
agency decisions under the Clean Air Act or the National Labor Relations 
Act could tend to implicate judicial political preferences.  Contrary to the 
existing scheme, that would, if true, militate in favor of placement in a 
relatively non-ideological forum.  District courts just might fit the bill.  Of 
course, to the extent these matters represent issues of national policy with 
likely appeals, such additional factors would cut the other way. 
d. Forum Shopping 
Related to the issue of ideology is the question of forum shopping.  The 
orthodox thinking on forum shopping goes like this: The practice of a 
litigant choosing a particular court or jurist for a strategic reason—such 
that Court X will tend to favor the litigant’s position over Court Y298—
represents a flaw in the judicial system.299  Not only is such a practice 
unseemly, but forum shopping has practical problems as well.  If an agency 
expects a challenge to a decision but does not know in which forum the 
challenge will be brought, the agency will not know which judges it will 
have to satisfy, nor even which circuit’s law will govern the challenge.300  
Although not without dissent, “forum shopping” is a dirty term among 
scholars and judges.301  At some level, opportunities for forum shopping 
may be a necessary evil, but we assume for purposes of this Article that a 
system that limits opportunities to forum shop is generally preferable to a 
system that promotes such opportunities. 
Opportunities for forum shopping only arise when plaintiffs have more 
 
 298. As Chris Whytock points out, forum shopping assumes not just multiple forums, but 
at least some degree of heterogeneity.  Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping 
System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 486 (2011).  Without heterogeneity, a plaintiff would have 
no reason to choose one forum over another. 
 299. The stakes of forum shopping take on even greater dimensions in the context of 
transnational litigation, where the choice of forums implicates not just a choice between two 
or more courts, but a choice between two or more countries, and often, two or more entirely 
different legal systems.  See id. at 485 (“Domestic forum shopping occurs when a plaintiff 
chooses between two or more courts within a single country’s legal system, whereas 
transnational forum shopping occurs when the choice is between the courts of two or more 
countries’ legal systems.”). 
 300. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 514 (2002). 
 301. For a brief summary of the benefits of forum shopping, see Thomas O. McGarity, 
Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 
318–19 (1980). 
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than one forum in which they can plausibly file suit.302  And concerns over 
forum shopping tend to become more pronounced as the number of 
available forums increases.  In other words, a scenario that presents only 
two potential forums is less problematic than a scenario giving rise to a 
dozen. 
With this in mind, a uniform system of initial review in district courts 
might, at first glance, seem to invite more forum shopping.  Especially in 
states with multiple districts (the majority), litigants could be afforded a 
choice of forum more frequently than if the statute called for direct review 
in the circuit court.  The loose character of venue statutes at the district 
court level undoubtedly provides plaintiffs with latitude in filing and, thus, 
opportunities to shop around.303  On the other hand, even when it is clear 
that initial review lies with the circuit court, forum shopping is not 
necessarily precluded.  Again, the APA does not identify a particular forum, 
and the venue provisions of individual agency statutes commonly allow for 
review in several possible circuits.304 
This is the problem of what we might call “horizontal forum shopping.”  
But the split scheme also allows for vertical forum shopping: the ability of 
the litigant to pick the level of the court, circuit or district.  For example, a 
challenge based on an agency action might go directly to the circuit court, 
so a clever litigant could recast the challenge as an agency’s failure to act to 
force the issue to the district court.  Or a litigant might choose to name 
particular agencies as defendants to force a case to a particular forum.305  
For many cases, there will be only one correct forum.  In these cases, we do 
not have a situation of concurrent jurisdiction—where two courts have 
legal authority to hear the suit—but nevertheless we have ambiguity as to 
which court has jurisdiction, allowing the challenging party to exploit the 
ambiguity to obtain a favored court.306  If a plaintiff can make a plausible 
argument of original jurisdiction in both the district court and circuit court, 
she has an opportunity to choose a forum based on strategic considerations 
where both courts’ interpretation of the law of jurisdiction would seem to 
indicate otherwise.  For other cases, however, a challenging party can pick 
a preferred forum through thoughtful casting of the challenge—an option 
that is made possible only through the divided scheme of review. 
 
 302. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 
553, 554 (1989) (“[F]orum shopping connotes the exercise of the plaintiff’s option to bring a 
lawsuit in one of several different courts.”). 
 303. McGarity, supra note 301, at 304 n.3. 
 304. McGarity, supra note 301, at 304. 
 305. See Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 306. Suburban Mortg. Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 480 F.3d 
1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lamenting the forum shopping generated by an ambiguous 
ruling dividing jurisdiction between the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts). 
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Although usually thought of from the perspective of a plaintiff, the 
current scheme also permits the agency some leeway in choosing a forum by 
modifying the type of decisionmaking process it will undertake.  For 
example, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that SEC has increasingly 
opted for administrative adjudications, which can be appealed directly to 
the court of appeals, instead of bringing suit in federal district court.307  
EPA avoids the Clean Air Act’s channeling of challenges to promulgated air 
quality standards to the D.C. Circuit308 by imposing its standards through 
decisions on individual plans.309  Jurisdictional divisions can be gamed by 
the agency as well as the challenger. 
2. The Added Value of District Court Review 
The argument for accuracy has so far considered the cases that are not 
appealed.  But what about the cases that end up in the circuit court 
anyway?  In the prior section, we noted that a pure cost approach might 
favor direct review of these decisions.  Yet the question is not simply the 
expense of a particular jurisdictional scheme but its value: what you get for 
what you spend.  As put by Justice Berger: “Efficiency must never be the 
primary objective of a free people.”310  Applying this rubric, the question of 
jurisdiction requires weighing the costs of an erroneous decision versus the 
cost of getting the right outcome.311  Far from being worthless, as the 
Supreme Court has implied, district courts improve the overall accuracy of 
the judicial system by offering useful opinions, providing a chance for 
litigants to narrow and improve their arguments, and potentially tempering 
ideology.  Moreover, for the fraction of cases that require resolution of 
factual disputes—notably facts relevant to standing, but also potentially 
issues about the scope of the record, or facts relevant to a constitutional 
case—district courts provide a decisive advantage. 
First, having one Article III judge work through the agency’s decision 
and record provides helpful guidance to the reviewing circuit court.  True, 
having a lower court opinion will not be as helpful in administrative review 
cases as it is in other cases, since the courts already have the benefit of a 
formal decision from the agency.312  But the added set of judicial eyes 
looking at an agency’s lengthy decision—with an administrative record 
 
 307. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 
2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413 
849590. 
 308. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012). 
 309. See Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 310. Leventhal, supra note 197, at 435. 
 311. See Shavell, supra note 238, at 387. 
 312. Currie & Goodman, supra note 13, at 17. 
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perhaps spanning thousands of pages—and applying the APA standard 
almost certainly provides some assistance to the appellate court.  Although 
this could backfire in some situations—such as if the panel used a faulty 
district court opinion as a roadmap for the analysis on appeal or as a 
summary of the administrative record—that seems unlikely to occur with 
any frequency. 
Moreover, the added layer provides a further opportunity to crystallize 
issues on appeal by reducing the volume and improving the quality of 
arguments.  By briefing the matter in the district court, the litigant will be 
forced to show her cards and, perhaps more importantly, see the 
opponent’s hand.  Rational litigants will abandon the arguments on which 
they are clearly outmatched, while fine-tuning potential winners in 
subsequent rounds of briefing before the circuit court.  The well-established 
rule of issue-forfeiture, if consistently applied, prevents litigants from raising 
new arguments on appeal.313 
The benefits of an added layer of review are highlighted by the common 
practice of district courts referring all challenges to Social Security 
Administration benefit determinations to magistrate judges for report and 
recommendation.314  By providing another judge’s analysis and giving 
litigants an opportunity to focus their challenge, this added layer of review 
is widely thought to be a helpful process rather than a wasteful one. 
In addition to issue clarification, it is plausible that channeling agency 
review cases through the district court would temper the ideological nature 
of judicial review.  As we discuss above, a common finding by empiricists is 
that judicial ideology plays a role in a significant number of cases, at least at 
the circuit court level.  But, as noted above, there are empirical and 
theoretical reasons to believe that district court decisionmaking tends to be 
less ideological.315  There are also reasons to believe that the influence of 
district judges’ opinions persists to the appellate level, such that the district 
judges serve as “hidden fourth members of the appellate panel[s].”316  We 
would expect, therefore, that routing a case through the less ideological 
district court decisionmaking process would lead to a less ideological 
decision on appeal.  Of course, empirical study is needed to confirm this.317 
 
 313. Bryant v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 314. E.g., Admin. Order 07-AO-015 (E.D. Mich. 2007), available at https://www.mied. 
uscourts.gov/PDFFIles/07-AO-015.pdf. 
 315. See supra notes 289–297 and accompanying text. 
 316. Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the 
Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1165 (2010). 
 317. An attempt to test this hypothesis was made by Frank Cross.  Cross found that in 
situations where a circuit court affirms a district court, a circuit panel whose ideology is 
unaligned with that of the district court will tend to issue a longer opinion than a panel 
whose ideology is a match.  Cross inferred that “longer opinions in this circumstance are 
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In the previous section, we observed that initial district court review 
could work as a timesaver by allowing circuit courts to engage in less 
thorough review on the eventual appeal.  The marginal gains of multi-layer 
review would be quickly washed away if circuit courts engage in 
commensurately less thorough review.  Even with unpublished opinions, 
however, the initial district court review is likely to improve circuit court 
accuracy because circuit courts are quite unlikely to give the quick 
treatment to every appeal from district courts.  Instead, circuit courts likely 
distinguish between “hard” and “easy” cases, giving the former a more 
thorough work-up than the latter.  District court review can help the circuit 
courts distinguish between the two types of cases,318 and for either type, 
district court review serves as an advantage.  For the hard cases that are 
given a close look by the circuit court, the arguments presented to the 
circuit court should be the better for having aged in the district court.  And 
for the easy cases, the circuit court can rest largely on the district court 
decision, freeing up resources for the hard cases. 
Further, as noted above, district courts have expertise when it comes to 
factual development and resolution of factual disputes.319  For the minority 
of APA cases that involve factual disputes—whether regarding litigant 
standing, constitutional issues, requests for preliminary relief, or debate 
about the scope of the record—district courts serve as a logical choice to 
hammer out these disputes. 
Given the benefits of added judicial brainpower, increased issue 
crystallization, potential tempering of ideological decisionmaking, and the 
resolution of factual disputes when appropriate, there is reason to think that 
district courts add value in administrative review cases, even when an 
eventual appeal is likely.  Quantifying the added value is no easy task, but 
we might theorize that it is at its peak in cases that are complicated or bear 
lengthy administrative records, cases with a strong threat of ideological 
judging, and cases where standing or constitutional issues are likely to be at 
play. 
G. Summary 
The arguments in favor of direct circuit court review depend on highly 
 
meant to limit the scope of the holding and its precedential effect because the outcome 
apparently does not align with judicial ideological preferences.”  FRANK B. CROSS, 
DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 66 (2007). 
 318. Again, it is possible that this could backfire in certain situations—a panel might 
falsely assume a case is simple based on an erroneously stripped-down analysis by the district 
court—but the sophistication of courts and litigants suggests that this would not happen very 
often. 
 319. See supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. 
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questionable premises.  Even if the seemliness argument had some merit, 
which it does not, it requires only that a circuit court be available at some 
stage in the process, not on direct review.  At best, the other arguments 
provide tentative support for direct circuit court review only in very limited 
circumstances, while favoring initial district court review most of the time.  
The conditions under which one arrangement is favorable to the other can 
be charted out as follows: 
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Figure 2: Conditions Favorable to Competing Jurisdictional Schemes 
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The best arguments for direct circuit review—cost and time savings and 
increased accuracy—are limited in their traction and must be balanced 
against the benefits of an added layer of review and the ability of circuit 
courts to spend resources where most needed.  For the cases that would not 
be appealed—most cases fall into this category—district courts are a clear 
bargain, providing high quality decisionmaking at a low price.  Unless we 
have reason to think they are making systematic errors that circuit courts 
would avoid, district courts are the logical choice. 
Even if a matter is likely to be appealed, the case for direct circuit court 
review is still highly tentative.  Because initial district court review adds 
some value to the decisionmaking process by resolving any factual disputes, 
improving argument quality, and tempering ideology, it is useful in difficult 
cases.  And because initial district court review facilitates the circuit court 
engaging in a more selective review, it is useful in easy cases where full 
circuit court involvement is unneeded.  This means that district courts add 
value in both easy and hard cases, further weakening the argument for 
direct circuit court review. 
III. THE NEED FOR UNIFORM RULES 
A. Uniform Rules 
As noted above, the calculus as to the “best” forum and hierarchy might 
differ from case to case depending on a number of specific circumstances.  
But attempting to tailor jurisdictional rules to classes of cases comes with 
two types of costs: the costs associated with making the initial choices and 
the costs of implementing those choices.320  First, there is the upfront cost of 
determining where the division of jurisdiction should lie.321  The marginal 
benefits of tailored jurisdiction depend on this division being made 
correctly.  If you guess wrong, and assign cases to the wrong jurisdictional 
treatment, you could be worse off than if you had stuck with a single rule.  
Calculating the best division depends on weighing competing factors and 
making important predictions about the future.  This cost is significant; in 
fact, as we have argued, Congress has not done a good job of allocating 
jurisdiction based on any policy preference that we can identify. 
Even the best predictions can turn stale over time.  Agencies evolve 
 
 320. Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 523–24 (2012); Harold Leventhal, Book Review of Henry J. 
Friendly’s Federal Jurisdiction: A General View, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1975) (describing 
how federal courts should be limited to appellate review and factfinding); Scott Dodson & 
Elizabeth McCuskey, Structuring Jurisdictional Rules and Standards, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
31, 35 (2012). 
 321. Nash, supra note 320, at 522. 
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through time, changing their regulatory focus and their means of 
implementing policy.  For example, over time, many agencies have become 
more reliant on rulemaking than individualized orders, perhaps departing 
from the expectations of the Congresses that provided for direct review only 
of “orders” and not “rules.”322  Moreover, the scope of an agency’s 
regulatory agenda can shift markedly due to changes in facts or the 
political/legal landscape.  The attacks of September 11, 2001 led to a 
major shift in the missions and methodologies of several agencies.  Once 
attracting only the interest of specialists, DHHS has become increasingly 
salient as debates over health care issues have rose to national prominence.  
But statutes do not automatically adapt to temporal changes, and the utility 
gains of today’s jurisdictional divide are rendered obsolete by the march of 
time.  Thus, the costs of designing the jurisdictional scheme do not end with 
implementation; it will also require very costly monitoring if maximum 
utility is to be achieved. 
The more damning problem with the effort to tailor jurisdiction is not 
the cost of design but of implementation.  Today, there is frequent 
indeterminacy in the appropriate forum for reviewing an agency’s action.  
Repeated Supreme Court involvement and diverging conclusions from 
sister circuits drive up the cost of litigating agency decisions.  The 
occasional and inconsistent interpretive methods employed by the courts 
exacerbate the existing statutory ambiguities and introduce new ones.  The 
ambiguity as to proper forum leads to substantial dead weight in terms of 
litigating disputes over jurisdiction and, perhaps even worse, missed 
opportunities based on jurisdictional uncertainty.323  It also can lead to 
potentially duplicative proceedings required when one aspect of a challenge 
is channeled to one forum and another aspect to another.324  These costs 
can quickly drown out any efficiency gains that might otherwise accrue. 
The best approach would be to have a single, uniform system.325  One 
easy fix would be to place all review in a single type of forum for all 
categories of agency action.  This would certainly reduce the amount of 
jurisdictional litigation.  Indeed, the strong trend over the last one hundred 
years in other areas is to move toward the approach of placing all cases on 
 
 322. Note, supra note 7, at 989–92. 
 323. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting potential for forfeited claims); cf. 
Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 168, at 1011 (noting the “inefficiency, uncertainty, and 
inaccuracy generated by standing doctrine also impose large costs on both parties and courts 
in cases where standing is ultimately found”). 
 324. Courts strive to interpret statutes to avoid bifurcated review, which reduces but 
does not eliminate the potential for simultaneous proceedings.  E.g., Wagner v. FEC, 717 
F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2013); JAFFE, supra note 137, at 158. 
 325. McAllister, supra note 80, at 167 (“If we are to continue to have some form of 
judicial review of administrative action the road to review should be as simple as possible.”). 
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the same judicial path.326  Thus, for instance, constitutional challenges to 
state laws no longer require a three-judge tribunal,327 and Supreme Court 
certiorari jurisdiction has become nearly universal.  Yet jurisdiction to 
review administrative review cases has stubbornly bucked this trend by 
getting more complicated. 
We recognize that it may be a bit much, particularly in today’s deeply 
cynical political environment, to expect Congress to go back and clean up 
the mess it has created over the past century through a large-scale 
recodification.328  However, as Congress enacts new legislation, creating 
new agencies, new programs, or new review schemes, it should strive to do 
a better job going forward than it has to date. 
B. Other Dividing Lines 
Although we favor a single scheme, a next best alternative would be to 
have a small number of clear rules dividing cases between the usual route of 
district court review and direct circuit court review.  The goal here is to 
define a dividing line that is relatively free from ambiguity, that is resistant 
to litigant manipulation through forum shopping, and that tends to place 
cases on the track that maximizes the benefits we lay out in this Article. 
Perhaps the most intuitive division would be between regulations and 
individualized orders.329  Regulations, having a broader impact, are more 
 
 326. Solimine, supra note 149, at 129–30 (discussing the use of three-judge district court 
panels in the Civil Rights Era). 
 327. Id. 
 328. A reallocation of jurisdiction would have short-term implications for workload.  For 
example, a universal rule that gives district courts jurisdiction over all administrative cases 
would add eight thousand cases a year to the district court docket.  Given that circuit courts 
are generally thought to be overworked, Congress might choose to hold the number of 
circuit court judgeships constant and simply add judgeships to the district courts.  But it 
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might be able to redesignate circuit judges as district judges.  This is an unsettled and 
controversial topic beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally David R. Stras & Ryan W. 
Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007).  Even if 
constitutional, redesignating existing personnel would raise fears by each political party of 
the other gaining an advantage through strategic designations.  A better approach would be 
to add judgeships to the district court, and allow circuit court judgeships to expire as they 
become vacant until the workload reaches the level deemed ideal by Congress. 
  While there would be an upfront cost to correct the workload imbalance, likely by 
adding district judgeships or prioritizing currently unfilled slots, the long term savings in 
transaction costs, not to mention likely gains in efficiency and accuracy, are well worth this 
fairly minor cost. 
 329. Although definitely preferable to the current system in terms of clarity, the dividing 
line between rules and orders still suffers from ambiguity at the margins.  Take a litigant who 
appeals from an agency’s adjudication of his case but in that process seeks to draw into 
question the agency’s regulation.  Or what about an agency that acts through precedent-
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likely to be challenged by multiple parties, and, therefore, benefit from the 
comparative authoritativeness of circuit court resolution of the legality of 
the agency decision.  Relatedly, we might expect that challenges to 
regulations are more likely to be appealed to circuit courts than 
individualized adjudications, given the rule’s broader impact, which could 
justify direct circuit review on an efficiency rationale.  Moreover, one might 
hypothesize (although further testing would be needed to confirm) that 
challenges to regulations tend to focus on legal questions—whether the rule 
satisfies Chevron, for instance, or the Constitution—than adjudications, 
which tend to involve fact-bound inquiries into whether the decision was 
arbitrary or capricious or supported by substantial evidence. 
Even for rules, however, the balance does not wholly favor direct circuit 
review.  Challenges to regulations are more likely to have fact-bound 
ripeness or standing issues at play, which can be readily resolved by the 
district court’s fact-finding machinery.  Moreover, the abstract legal nature 
of many challenges to regulations potentially invites ideological 
decisionmaking, which should be mitigated to the extent possible.  Finally, 
the complexity and importance of nationwide regulation favors additional 
deliberation, which favors allowing disputes to marinate a bit in district 
court before locking in a rule at the circuit court.  As with every category of 
case that we have imagined so far, the rationales do not universally point to 
one court over another. 
CONCLUSION 
Our primary goal here was to suggest a framework for analyzing future 
decisions about jurisdiction, relying on data-driven goals of accuracy and 
efficiency.  Our secondary goal was to urge fewer, clearer rules.  Applying 
the framework, we find that the case for direct circuit court review has not 
been made, and a single system of judicial review that begins in the district 
court would be a better approach.  Going forward, Congress should pay 
more attention to the difficulties of a divided system of review and consider 
more closely how it allocates review of agency decisions.  Better yet, 
Congress should revisit its prior choices and bring some order to the chaos 
by adopting uniform legislation with simple rules. 
Beyond major policy implications, we offer several specific lessons for 
courts and litigants who must struggle with the existing system.  For the 
judiciary, we urge the adoption of predictable interpretive approaches.  
Jurists’ occasional and inconsistent reliance on their own policy perspectives 
 
setting, broad actions that are not regulations, such as Clean Air Act State Implementation 
Plans?  As highlighted by the cases discussed in Part I.B.3, courts have not found the 
rule/order division to be clear so far, and there is little reason to think that such a system 
would eliminate ambiguity. 
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only makes matters worse for litigants by grafting ambiguity onto 
ambiguity. 
Moreover, when a litigant chooses the wrong forum, courts should 
recognize the difficulty of the jurisdictional maze and exercise their 
discretion to transfer a case to the right court, at least absent evidence of 
bad faith or dilatory motive.330  And when a litigant prudently files a 
challenge in multiple courts, the courts can avoid wasting time by staying 
one of the cases and resolving jurisdiction as the first priority. 
We also identify a need for greater attention to the manner in which 
district courts apply procedural rules to APA cases.  A substantial fraction 
of the district court docket is spent on APA cases, yet the civil rules that 
apply to all proceedings in district court are quite awkward in these cases.  
Although many district courts or judges have come up with ways to 
implement the Civil Rules so as to better match the peculiarities of APA 
cases, the process is ad hoc and unpredictable.  It is well past time that we 
amend the Civil Rules to reflect the idiosyncrasies of record-review matters. 
Finally, we identify a number of unanswered empirical questions that 
reflect a great level of uncertainty about how judicial review of agency 
action is carried out in the real world.  We plan to address some of these 
questions in future empirical work. 
The overall message is clear: The burden is on proponents of direct 
circuit court review to make their case.  And for supporters of the current 
approach—ad hoc slicing and dicing from statute to statute and agency to 
agency—that burden looks to be insurmountable. 
 
 330. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
